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1 Introduction
It is an honour to commemorate Hans-Dieter Zeh, whose contributions to foundational physics,
especially in the areas of quantum decoherence and the nature of time, were so significant. We
would like to do so by reviewing three broadly geometrodynamical—and in part Machian or
‘relational’—projects. The review is prompted by a recent literature in the philosophy of
physics, about a doctrine called ‘spacetime functionalism’: which, as we will explain, each of
the three projects vividly illustrates. Although these projects, and so this paper, are confined
to classical physics, the final Section will briefly discuss quantum aspects. Thus we will briefly
connect with Zeh’s own ideas about how his two main areas were linked: for example, that the
matter degrees of freedom could decohere the metric-gravitational degrees of freedom so as to
enable, in an Everett-style interpretation, a classical time to emerge.
We first introduce the projects (Section 1.1). Then we give some details about the physics
(Section 1.2), and the philosophy (Section 1.3). These details come together in Section 1.4.
1.1 Three projects
Recently, a literature has sprung up about ‘spacetime functionalism’. Like all ‘isms’, it comes
in various versions. But the broad idea is that the concept of spacetime, and other more specific
chrono-geometric concepts such as ‘distance’ ‘simultaneity’ or ‘inertial frame’, are functional
concepts. This means, roughly speaking, that the concept is defined by its pattern of relations
to other concepts. The pattern is called the concept’s functional role; so the idea is that you
best understand the concept by looking at ‘the role it plays’. Hence the slogan: ‘spacetime
is as spacetime does’. Here the ‘does’—what makes up the functional role—is realized i.e.
instantiated by the physics of matter and radiation. So spacetime functionalism is closely
related to relational, and specifically Machian, approaches to chrono-geometry and dynamics;
and to what has recently been called the ‘dynamical approach’ to chrono-geometry.1
We are sympathetic to spacetime functionalism. But in two previous papers, we argued
that the recent literature missed a trick—though there was also good news.
The missed trick was that this literature did not notice that in its original and, we think,
best formulation (by Lewis), functionalism is a variety of reduction. In reduction, a problematic
discourse or theory is vindicated or legitimized by being reduced to (i.e. shown to be a part of)
an unproblematic discourse or theory. In functionalism, this reduction is achieved by spelling
out the functional roles of the problematic discourse’s concepts or properties, and arguing that
each of them is uniquely realized i.e. instantiated by certain (usually complicated) concepts or
properties of the unproblematic discourse.
Thus we urged that spacetime functionalism should say that a chrono-geometric concept is,
or several such concepts are, uniquely specifiable in terms of their functional roles (patterns of
relations). Then the thrust of the reduction—and the echo of Machian and relationist ideas—
is that these functional roles are realized by (usually complicated) features of the physics of
matter and radiation, without adverting to other concepts of chrono-geometry.
The good news was that the older literature in foundations of chrono-geometry (before
the recent label ‘functionalism’) contained successful examples of this reductive endeavour.
We reported four such examples: cases where the unique specifiability of a chrono-geometric
1Spacetime functionalism has also recently been a theme in philosophical discussions of the emergence of
spacetime from quantum gravity. We will here set this aside, apart from our brief return to Zeh in our final
Section. But we thank Nick Huggett for stressing to us the question whether the concepts in a putative quantum
gravity theory—the “bottom” theory in Section 1.3’s jargon—can be grasped without invoking spatiotemporal
notions. For more discussion, cf. e.g. Huggett & Wu¨thrich (2021, Introduction, Section 6) and Lam & Wu¨thrich
(2020).
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concept in terms of matter and radiation, and the corresponding reduction, was secured by a
precise theorem.2
We can now state this paper’s aim: to show that three projects in the physics literature
give vivid and impressive illustrations of spacetime functionalism. As it happens, they have
hitherto been almost wholly ignored by philosophers of physics; so we submit that they deserve
philosophers’ attention. The first project is forty years old and is well-known in mathematical
relativity. But the other two are much more recent and less well-known—so, again: worth
advertising.
More specifically, each of these projects illustrates functionalism about time. So in broad
philosophical terms, they each assume that:
(a) some discourse or theory about matter and radiation, and space, is unproblematic;
while
(b) a discourse or theory about time is problematic, and is to be vindicated by being
reduced to (shown to follow from) the unproblematic.
In slightly more technical terms: each provides, within a theory about spatial geometry, a
functionalist reduction of the temporal metric and time-evolution: and the reduction is summed
up in a theorem that the temporal metric and-or the Hamiltonian governing time-evolution is,
in an appropriate sense, unique.3
These three lines of work are all ‘general-relativistic’, in a sense we will make precise. But
they differ substantially in exactly what they assume, and in what they deduce. They are, in
short:
(1): The recovery of geometrodynamics, i.e. general relativity’s usual Hamiltonian,
from requirements on deformations of hypersurfaces in a Lorentzian spacetime. This is due to
Hojman et al. (1976).
(2): The programme of Schuller et al.: Du¨ll et al. (2018); Schuller (2011). They deduce
from assumptions about matter and radiation in a 4-dimensional manifold that is not initially
assumed to have a Lorentzian metric, the existence of a ‘generalized metric’, with e.g. causal
future and past cones and mass hyperbolas; and they deduce a lot about how their generalized
metric relates to matter and radiation.
(3): The deduction of general relativity’s usual Hamiltonian in a framework without
even a spacetime: that is, without initially assuming a 4-dimensional manifold, let alone one
with a Lorentzian metric. This is due to Gomes & Shyam (2016) (with precursors in Giulini
(1995) and Barbour et al. (2002)).
We will discuss these in this order: in Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Then in Section 5,
we give a positive corollary of (3). In short: (3) answers a misgiving you might have about
a recent programme in the foundations of classical gravity, viz. shape dynamics. Section 6
concludes with a table summarising the results surveyed, and briefly draws some connections
with the work of H-D. Zeh.
2The ‘missed trick’ accusation, and our overall account of functionalism and reduction, is in our Butterfield
& Gomes (2020a). The ‘good news’ examples are in our Butterfield & Gomes (2020b). Of these examples, the
fourth is Barbour and Bertotti’s Machian dynamics Barbour & Bertotti (1982), in which a temporal metric is
defined by the dynamics of the point-particles. So this example also illustrates this paper’s specific topic, of
functionalism about the temporal metric.
3The words ‘problematic’ and ‘unproblematic’ are our labels: these projects’ authors do not use them.
We admit they are imperfect: one might prefer less judgmental adjectives such as ‘troublesome’ and ‘okay’
(a suggestion we discuss in Section 1.3). And whatever the adjectives, one could of course resist the urge to
philosophize! One could abjure all ideas about reducing chrono-geometry, and read the uniqueness results as
“just” mathematical theorems. But as we read these projects’ authors, they do sympathize with the endeavour
of reduction.
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1.2 Appetizer: the projects introduced
All three projects are relativistic, indeed general-relativistic. In calling them ‘general-relativistic’,
we mean, more precisely: (a) they either assume or deduce a Lorentzian metric, and a dynam-
ical geometry, i.e. a spatial geometry that varies in time according to an equation of motion;
and (b) they focus on this equation of motion being the orthodox general-relativistic one. Thus
in this paper, the label ‘general relativistic’ connotes a notion of evolution, and, indirectly, of
global hyperbolicity, that is not present in the Einstein field equations simpliciter.
But note our phrases: ‘either assume or deduce’; and ‘focus on’, rather than ‘prove’. That
is, as these phrases suggest: these projects’ details differ considerably. There are contrasts both
about what is assumed, and about what is proved. For example, each of the first and third
projects deduces the orthodox general-relativistic Hamiltonian in the presence of any of a wide
class of matter fields; but the second project does not. And while the first project assumes
a 4-dimensional spacetime manifold and Lorentzian metric, and the second project assumes a
spacetime manifold: the third manages to avoid assuming either of these concepts. It assumes
only a spatial 3-manifold, from which it in effects builds a spacetime manifold.
We introduce the three projects, in more detail as follows.
1. The first project Hojman et al. (1976) assumes a 4-dimensional spacetime manifold with
a Lorentzian metric. But Hojman et al. adopt a ‘3+1’ or ‘canonical’ perspective: so
they consider 3-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces each equipped with its Riemannian
geometry, and discuss how such a space, Σ say, can be embedded in spacetime. They show
that if we transcribe some natural requirements about how these embeddings mesh—the
requirements are encoded in a deformation algebra—into a Hamiltonian framework for
describing how the spatial geometry on Σ changes, so as to give a constraint algebra,
then the Hamiltonian must be the usual Hamiltonian in general relativity in its ADM
form. This is a remarkable, and rightly lauded, achievement.
In short, and in philosophers’ jargon: Hojman et al. show that the ADM Hamiltonian
is the unique realizer of the functional role ‘... is the generator of how spatial geometry
changes over time, that reproduces the assumed deformation algebra of hypersurfaces’.
The technical apparatus used by this first project is also important for us, since parts of
it will appear again in the second and third projects.
2. On the other hand, the second project Du¨ll et al. (2018); Schuller (2011) assumes a space-
time manifold that is not considered as foliated, nor is even required to have a Lorentzian
metric. It then proceeds in two stages. The first stage assumes that the dynamics of
any matter-or-radiation fields in the spacetime obey some conceptual requirements, e.g.
about being ‘well-behaved’ and ‘predictive’ in certain senses, and about being deduced
from a diffeomorphism-invariant action functional. These assumptions imply a descrip-
tion of a causal structure for the spacetime, and so of spatial hypersurfaces, and of how
a generalized, tensorial spatial geometry changes over time, satisfying certain properties.
Then the second stage adopts a 3+1 decomposition, and applies the apparatus of Hoj-
man et al., i.e. the first project, to show that this description is consistent, i.e. can be
satisfied.
So far, the only specific matter-or-radiation dynamics for which the resulting consistency
equations have been solved is classical electromagnetism: for which the resulting evolution
of spatial geometry is (like in the first project) exactly as described by general relativity,
i.e. by the ADM Hamiltonian. (In saying ‘the only known solution’, we do not a criticism
of the programme: it is a familiar point that a reduction can be of restricted scope, a
‘local reduction’, yet of great scientific interest.)
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This is, we submit, a remarkable achievement. It deserves to be better known by philoso-
phers: not least because of its evident affinities with the ‘dynamical relativity’ viewpoint
of Brown (2006), and the spacetime functionalism literature (which was prompted in
part by that viewpoint). Thus in this project, the functional role of the temporal metric
requires that the equations of motion of the matter-or-radiation fields should be well-
behaved and predictive in senses that turn out to define causal cones and make time
“the dimension along which we make predictions.”4 In Section 3, we will discuss these
affinities in more detail.
For the moment, we just note the obvious moral: that here is another uniqueness result
a` la functionalism. In short, it is: given these authors’ general assumptions, and classical
electromagnetism, general relativity i.e. the ADM Hamiltonian uniquely satisfies the
functional role ‘... describes how spatial geometry changes over time’ (where this last
phrase gets spelt out in terms of predictivity etc.).
But there is a caveat: these authors’ deduction of general relativity depends sensitively
on their assumption of spacetime diffeomorphism invariance. For we will see (in Section
3.4) that without it, there are models of their other assumptions that have the Maxwell
field coupled to the Lorentzian metric in the usual way, and obeying Maxwell’s equations
(in temporal gauge), while the evolution of geometry is completely different from that of
general relativity. More generally: it is not clear how broad a class of assumptions within
these authors’ framework, would yield orthodox couplings between matter or radiation,
and a Lorentzian metric with orthodox i.e. general-relativistic evolution of geometry.
3. Finally, the third project Gomes & Shyam (2016) is more austere, i.e. self-denying, in its
initial assumptions about the ‘unproblematic’ base, from which to build the reduction of
the ‘problematic’ temporal metric. It does not assume, ab initio, a spacetime manifold.
It assumes a 3-manifold whose spatial geometry is to vary over time, in a manner that is
locally definable in a certain sense: roughly, that local changes of a quantity in distinct
spatial regions are required to commute in an appropriate way. This assumption is then
set in a Hamiltonian framework, with some technical conditions, such as the Hamiltonian
being at most second-order in momenta.
Remarkably, it turns out that these assumptions are enough to construct a spacetime, with
a Lorentzian metric; and to show that the geometry evolves over time according to the
general-relativistic Hamiltonian, i.e. the ADM Hamiltonian. Besides, this construction
holds good in the presence of any of a wide class of matter and radiation fields, not just
e.g. electromagnetism.5
We will see in Section 4 that this result is a descendant, for relativistic field theories with
a dynamical spatial geometry, of Barbour and Bertotti’s definition of the temporal metric
in their non-relativistic Machian particle dynamics (Barbour & Bertotti (1982), reviewed
in our Butterfield & Gomes (2020b); cf. footnote 2).
So here again is a uniqueness result, consonant with functionalism. The ADM Hamil-
tonian is the unique realizer of the functional role ‘... is the generator of how spatial
4This project’s requirement that the dynamics of matter be predictive yields another affinity. Namely, with
the proposal Callender (2017, Ch. 7) that time is characterised in contrast to space by the fact that data
can be specified on spacelike surfaces, but not timelike and null surfaces, in an unconstrained way. He argues
that this makes partial differential equations that evolve data from spacelike surfaces ‘more informative’, in a
sense that he derives from a broadly Humean account of laws of nature as summaries of informative patterns
in phenomena. We will not pursue details of this imaginative proposal: James (2020) is a detailed assessment.
5This project, as well as project (1) of Hojman et al., naturally allow for an Euclidean version of geometro-
dynamics. In both cases, we can impose further conditions that would specialize to the Lorentzian signature.
6
geometry changes over time, in a locally definable way, without assuming spacetime’.
Broadly speaking, this is a stronger result than predecessors since there is no initial
assumption of a spacetime.
Besides, we will see in Section 5 that this result has a positive corollary for a recent pro-
gramme in classical gravity, viz. shape dynamics. Namely: this result exonerates shape
dynamics from the accusation that, because in a certain regime its Hamiltonian matches
that of general relativity, shape dynamics amounts to ‘theft’ rather than ‘honest toil’, as
Bertrand Russell’s much-cited quip puts it. In a bit more detail, the point will be: agreed,
shape dynamics can admit to having, as a matter of its own history, ‘piggy-backed’ on
general relativity in the formulation of its Hamiltonian. But this result shows that this
‘piggy-backing’ need not be ‘theft’. For shape dynamics can ‘take over’—i.e. an advocate
of shape dynamics can transcribe into their formalism—the derivation of Section 4’s re-
sult, and so obtain the desired Hamiltonian—even without initially assuming a spacetime
manifold. In short, the result has the merits of ‘honest toil’, and shape dynamics can
invoke that toil, to answer the accusation of ‘theft’.
To sum up this appetizer: all three projects have as their punchline, an impressive unique-
ness result, that the orthodox Hamiltonian of 3+1 general relativity, the ADM Hamiltonian,
is the unique satisfier of a condition. In philosophers’ jargon: it is the unique realizer of a
functional role. The results vary in their assumptions. In particular: as one passes from (1) to
(3), less is assumed about the manifold. One ends with (3) only assuming a 3-manifold with a
spatial metric; and while (2) assumes a 4-manifold, it does not postulate ab initio any metric,
even a spatial one. Also, the detail of what is deduced varies. For example, both (1) and (3)
apply to a wide class of matter fields; while for (2) the uniqueness result is, so far, ‘local’, i.e.
proven only for electromagnetism.
1.3 Functionalist reduction: a review
In Section 1.1 we said about reduction and functionalism, only that:
(i) in a functionalist reduction, the functional roles of the concepts or properties of the
problematic discourse or theory are argued to be uniquely realized by concepts and properties
of the unproblematic discourse or theory; and
(ii) for this paper’s three projects, it is time, especially the temporal metric, that is
problematic, while spatial geometry, and the physics of matter and radiation, are unproblem-
atic.
In this Section, we will fill out (i). We will begin with how philosophers of science (and indeed,
philosophically inclined physicists) usually discuss reduction of one theory to another. This will
be a matter of recalling the basic idea of Nagel’s account of reduction. Then we will expound
functionalism, in the formulation of Lewis. We will introduce functional definition, and then
stress how functionalist reduction differs from—we say: improves on—Nagelian reduction. (All
this will summarise Sections 2 to 5 of our Butterfield & Gomes (2020a): they contain vari-
ous developments, defences and references which, for reasons of space, we here forego.) With
this review in hand, Section 1.4 will then spell out how this paper’s three projects illustrate
functionalist reduction, thus filling out (ii) above.
Nagelian and functionalist reduction contrasted In Nagelian reduction, one envisages reducing
one theory, say Tt (‘t’ for ‘top’), to another, say Tb (‘b’ for ‘bottom’), by adding to Tb a set B
of so-called bridge-laws. The core idea is that these are sentences that use the vocabularies of
both Tb and Tt in such a way that from the conjunction of Tb and B, one can deduce all of Tt
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(Nagel (1961, pp. 354-358); Nagel (2008, pp. 361-373)). So, assuming that theories are sets of
sentences closed under deduction, Tt is shown to be part of, i.e. already contained in, Tb. The
traditional idea is that Tb is an improvement on Tt, since it recovers Tt’s successes but also says
more. So ‘b’ is also a mnemonic for ‘better’ and ‘t’ is a mnemonic for ‘tainted’.6
Several adjustments or variations of this core idea are widely agreed (including by Nagel
himself: Butterfield (2011); Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010); Schaffner (2012)). Most philoso-
phers agree that to fit real-life scientific cases, one must allow that, not all of Tt, but only most
of it, or some approximation or analogue, of it, is deduced from the conjunction of Tb and B.
And most philosophers agree that bridge-laws do not always (even collectively) ‘define’ each Tt
term, even in the usual minimal sense of logic books: viz. specifying the term’s (contingent)
extension—nevermind its intension or “meaning”. (For a predicate F , the extension is the set
of actual instances of F ; for a name or other expression referring to an object e.g. a definite
description ‘the unique F ’, it is that object.) After all: not determining such extensions is per-
fectly compatible with our nevertheless being able to deduce all of Tt—as Nagelian reduction
demands.
This “looseness” means that there can be a choice of which bridge-laws to postulate: a
choice of which set B to add to Tb, in order to deduce Tt, or an approximation or analogue
of it. For there might be more than one way to relate all of Tt’s terms to those of Tb, while
nevertheless securing the deduction. Of course, this is not to say that all such choices are
equally good; and one would expect it to be a matter of scientific judgment, relative to perhaps
various criteria, which bridge-laws to postulate. Indeed, most philosophers in the Nagelian
tradition regard it as a matter of scientific judgment, whether to postulate bridge-laws at all
and thereby perform a reduction. Thus their rationale for a reduction is often that it makes
for a more unified, or more parsimonious or simpler, picture of the world.
We can now state the contrast with functionalist reduction, as formulated by Lewis. It says
instead:
(i): Each bridge-law connects just one Tt term with the vocabulary of Tb.
(ii): Each bridge-law ‘defines’ its Tt term, in logicians’ weak sense of specifying its
extension. But beware: (a) the extension specified by the bridge-law is contingent, and need
not reflect pre-given meanings of the terms involved; and (b) the bridge-law ‘definition’ is not
one of the functional definitions emphasised by functionalism—for as we will see in a moment,
the functional definition of a Tt term is given wholly within Tt.
(iii): The bridge-laws are contingent statements: they are statements of contingent
co-extension. (That is: two predicates have the same set of actual instances; two referring
expressions actually refer to the same object.) But they should not be called ‘hypotheses’.
For they are mandatory, not optional. There is no variety or choice or optionality, of the sort
Nagelians envisaged.
Lewis defends these proposals about reduction and bridge-laws as part of his overall view
about functionalism. But in his classic expositions of his overall view Lewis (1970, 1972), these
proposals about bridge-laws come after his main statements about functionalism, i.e. towards
the ends of the papers (viz. at Lewis (1970, pp. 441-445); Lewis (1972, 255f)). As a result, in
the subsequent literature they have been much less emphasised than the main statements. This
has been unfortunate since it has fostered the widespread view that functionalism is opposed
to reduction—when in fact Lewis has shown how they can be persuasively combined.7
6Beware: philosophers and physicists use ‘reduce’ in converse senses. We adopt the philosophical jargon, in
which the ‘tainted’ or ‘worse’ theory is reduced to the better one; but physicists say that, for example, special
relativistic kinematics reduces to Newtonian kinematics for small velocities.
7The worthy exception to this unfortunate neglect is ‘the Canberra Plan’. This is the nickname for advocacy
of Lewisian functionalist reduction, which is familiar in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and ethics (to which
Lewis also applied the doctrine): but which is unfortunately almost unknown to philosophers of science, and
wholly unknown to recent ‘spacetime functionalists’. So our position in this and our other papers is that
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To explain Lewis’ proposals (i) to (iii), the key idea is that while Nagelian reduction con-
trasts two vocabularies, viz. those of the two theories Tt and Tb: for Lewisian reduction, there
are three vocabularies at issue—not two. The reason is that within Tt, there is a division of
vocabulary, into two sorts. Each term in one sort will get functionally defined in terms of items
in the other sort. So for the next few paragraphs, we set aside reduction, and focus only on Tt.
Functional definition First, there are the terms8 that have an agreed interpretation in a
certain domain. Lewis calls them O-terms, where O stands for ‘old’. Another good mnemonic
is ‘okay’ (suggested by Button & Walsh (2018, p. 55)). For the idea is that O-terms are fully
understood: there is nothing problematic about them. So as Lewis stresses: O does not stand
for ‘observational’, as against ‘theoretical’ in the sense of ‘non-observational’.9 So there is an
agreed, unproblematic or ‘okay’, notion of truth in that domain for sentences of Tt that contain
only O-terms.
Then there are the other terms of Tt: terms that, Lewis proposes, Tt introduces to us for the
first time, so that their interpretation is not settled. Lewis calls them T -terms. But again, as
he stresses: T does not stand for ‘theoretical’, as against ‘observational’—any more than his O
stands for ‘observational’. The Tt-terms are just new terms, whose interpretation needs to be
settled. Another good mnemonic is ‘troublesome’ (Button and Walsh ibid.): for the Tt-terms
are troublesome, problematic, at least in the minimal sense of our needing to interpret them.
Lewis now proposes that the assertions of Tt, taken together, give sufficiently rich informa-
tion about how all the T -terms are related, both to the (old, interpreted) O-terms in Tt, and to
each other, that the truth of Tt (and so advocacy of Tt) implies that each T -term has a unique
interpretation. That is: advocacy of Tt involves claiming that each such term has a unique
extension, that is implicitly determined by the entirety of Tt. Assuming this uniqueness, Lewis
then provides a systematic procedure whereby given Tt, one can write down definitions (in
the usual logicians’ weak sense of: specifications of extensions) of each of the T -terms. So he
provides a procedure for getting simultaneous unique definitions.
Here we meet the jargon of functional role, announced at the beginning of Section 1.1. The
general idea is that a property or concept of interest can be uniquely specified by a pattern
of relations (typically: causal or nomic, i.e. law-like, relations) that it has to other properties.
The pattern is called the property’s functional role. The property is called the realizer or
occupant of the role.10
philosophy of chrono-geometry gives good illustrations of the Canberra Plan. As will be clear, our main
difference from the usual Plan will be that we do not require the functional tole of a concept, extracted
from the top theory Tt, to be strictly faithful to some pre-given meaning, or to give what philosophers call a
‘conceptual analysis’. For details of the Canberra Plan, cf. Braddon-Mitchell & Nola (2009).
For physicist readers, a further word of introduction about Lewis might be helpful. He was a giant of
twentieth-century philosophy; and although he never worked in philosophy of physics, his views about topics
other than reduction (especially about modality and causation), have close connections with foundational issues
in spacetime theories, and in mechanics, both classical and quantum. Cf. for example, Butterfield (1989, 1992,
2004).
8We concentrate on predicates. Let us assume that names and other expressions referring to objects, e.g.
definite descriptions, are eliminated in favour of predicates in the usual way.
9So Lewis does not aim to ‘reduce theory to observation’ in the way that some logical empiricists did. More
generally: his treatment of both functionalism and reduction is “realist”, not “instrumentalist” or “elimina-
tivist” about Tt.
10(1): Nothing here will turn on any distinction one might make between property and concept. So we will
mostly say ‘property’. But note that accordingly, ‘properties’ includes also relations, of two or more places.
(2): We will mostly say ‘specified’, ‘specification’ etc., though often ‘defined’ and ‘definition’ is used. Saying
‘specified’ and ‘specification’ has the advantage of avoiding the connotations of either free verbal stipulation,
or of being faithful to a pre-given meaning. This is an advantage since in some examples these connotations do
not hold good.
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In this paper, we do not need the details of Lewis’ procedure for extracting from Tt specifi-
cations of the extensions of each of its T -terms: his procedure for getting simultaneous unique
definitions. The reason is essentially that within each of our three projects, only one T -term,
viz. the temporal metric, gets specified. So for us it suffices to note the following six points.
(1): When we envisage a whole set of properties being functional, i.e. specified by their
relations to each other and to yet other properties, one naturally worries that there will be a
vicious “logical circle” of specification. For if one property X is specified by its functional role
that mentions another property Y , and vice versa, i.e. Y ’s functional role mentions X: then
surely there is a circle, and both specifications fail. And similarly for circles with more than
two members.
(2): But Lewis showed that there need be no logical circle. To avoid such circles, one
need only maintain that the body of doctrine mentioning the properties (in our notation: the
theory Tt) is sufficiently informative or rich (logically strong) that each of the functional roles
is satisfied by just one property. That is: one maintains that each functional role has a unique
realizer. Then each such property can be specified by its functional role, without any logical
circularity. Each T -term has its extension fixed by its functional role; and although the func-
tional role seems to include other T -terms, they are eliminated, so that au fond the functional
role uses only O-terms.11
(3): The main area in which this insight, of simultaneous unique definability, has been
discussed is philosophy of mind. Here, mental properties are considered problematic; while bod-
ily and behavioural properties are unproblematic. So the functionalist idea is that each mental
property, like being in pain or believing that it is raining, is specified by its functional role: its
characteristic pattern of relations to other mental properties, and to bodily/behavioural prop-
erties. For example: being in pain is specified by its being typically caused by tissue damage
and its typically causing both distress (another mental property) and aversive behaviour. So
here, Tt is the non-technical everyday theory of mental lives and behaviour, often called ‘folk
psychology’. And in this area, Lewis’ insight is that by extracting mental properties’ func-
tional roles from folk psychology, these properties can all be simultaneously uniquely specified,
without logical circularity, in terms of bodily and behavioural properties.
(4): Lewis does not require unique realization in “all possible worlds”, but only in the
actual world: ‘I am not claiming that scientific theories are formulated in such a way that they
could not possibly be multiply realized. I am claiming only that it is reasonable to hope that
a good theory will not in fact be multiply realized’ Lewis (1970, pp. 433).
(5): Lewis of course discusses the cases where there is not a unique realizer, or more
than one; and also nuanced cases like (a’) there is none, but there are near-realizers, of which
perhaps one is nearer than the others; and (b’) there are many, but some are (perhaps one is)
in some way a better realizer than the others. (Cf. also Butterfield & Gomes (2020a, Sections
3.3-3.5, 4.2 and 5).) But here we can skip details, since this paper’s three projects are ‘clean’.
In each of them, the functional role of the temporal metric has a unique realizer. (But we will
briefly meet a nearest realizer in Section 5.3.)
(6): Lewis is not suggesting that Tt says all there is to know about the interpretation
of a T -term. On the contrary: we might come to know much else about it, after or indepen-
dently of our acceptance of Tt. This point is all-important for Lewis’ account of reduction and
bridge-laws—to which we now return.
11For details, cf.:Lewis (1970, pp. 428-438), with ancillary material in 438-441; Lewis (1972, pp. 253-254);
our Butterfield & Gomes (2020a, Section 4). Lewis also gives (1972, 250-253) as a parable, a detective story
in which the detective gathers information about three conspirators to a murder, whom he labels X,Y and Z:
sufficiently rich information that for it to be true, X,Y and Z must be three people, whom he and the police
know by other means—so that they can be arrested.
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Functionalist reduction and mandatory bridge-laws Suppose that after accepting, or indepen-
dently of accepting, Tt and its simultaneous functional specifications, we come to accept another
way of specifying the realizers of the functional roles. Then since the realizer of each functional
role is unique, we must accept an identity statement—we must identify the original realizer with
the new specification. In the jargon of reduction: we must accept that the original property is
reduced to the new specification.
In terms of our notation of Tt and Tb, and the example of pain (cf. point (3) above):—
Suppose we develop a theory Tb of neurophysiology. It has its own specialist vocabulary:
‘neuron’, ‘synapse’ etc. But it may well also use some or all of the unproblematic O-terms
(bodily and behavioural terms) of Tt, i.e. of folk psychology. Then for the example of pain:
we can imagine discovering that a neurophysiological property, say ‘C-fibre firing’, realizes the
functional role of pain, as it was spelt out in the Tt. Then we must accept: pain is C-fibre
firing. This is the point that we labeled (iii), when we contrasted Nagelian and functionalist
reduction. Namely: in the latter, bridge laws are mandatory.
Now we also see why there are three vocabularies at issue in reduction; (not two, as dis-
cussions of reduction usually assume—one for Tt, one for Tb). For first: the reduced theory’s
vocabulary divides into two sorts, a division that sets the stage for functionally defining the first
in terms of the second; and then there is the reducing theory’s vocabulary—in our example,
neurophysiological vocabulary (‘neuron’, ‘C-fibre firing’).
These ideas are all illustrated in this inference, from two premises:
i): Being in pain = the inner state that is typically caused by tissue damage and
typically causes both distress and aversive behaviour;
ii) C-fibre-firing = the inner state that is typically caused by tissue damage and
typically causes both distress and aversive behaviour; .
So, iii): Being in pain = C-fibre-firing.
We accept i) because of Tt. This first premise is the functional definition, with ‘distress’ being,
like ‘pain’, a mental term; whose occurrence in the definiens signals the idea (and legitimacy!)
of simultaneous definition. We accept ii) by accepting the later (or independent) theory that
we have labelled Tb: for this example, contingent neurophysiology. And we infer iii) by the
transitivity of identity (i.e. of co-extensiveness of predicates). Thus iii) is the derived bridge-
law. It is a contingent statement of co-extension (since premise i) is contingent).
To sum up: this example makes clear how we are, as Lewis puts, ‘logically compelled to make
theoretical identifications’ 1970, p. 441), given premises to which we are already committed.
To put the premises in general terms:
1) according to Tt, our Tt-term τ (e.g. ‘being in pain’) has a unique realizer (extension,
referent), that is specified by its pattern of relations, its functional definition; and
2) according to our later (or independent) theory Tb, ρ (‘ρ’ for ‘reducing’) also refers to that
realizer.
So we must infer: τ = ρ.
It seems that many scientific examples of reduction fit this account. An obvious, because
famous, example is Maxwell’s theoretical identification of visible light with electromagnetic
waves. To put this with a cartoon-like simplicity: recall that Maxwell calculated within his
electromagnetic theory that some solutions were wave oscillations of the electric and magnetic
fields, that travelled at ca. 3 × 105 km s−1. This was very close to the measured speed of
visible light; and it strained credulity to imagine that two mutually independent phenomena
propagated at the same speed. So he inferred that light consisted of these oscillating solutions
to his equations. In terms of the notation above: the (rough!) functional role is ‘travels at ca.
3× 105 km s−1’; the T -term ‘visible light’ in the contemporary theory of optics (τ in our Tt) is
functionally defined by this role; and ‘(suitable) oscillating solution of the Maxwell equations’
is the other term ρ drawn from the reducing theory Tb, i.e. Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory.
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Agreed, this is a cartoon of what Maxwell did. And one naturally fears that many, perhaps
most, real-life scientific cases that are called ‘reductions’ will not conform to this neat account.
But there are two points to make in its defence; the second is specific to this paper.
(i): Lewis also gives two examples fitting his account (1970, 443-444), argues that other
cases do conform to it (1970, 444-445), and also discusses how the account treats later revisions
of the theories (1970, 445-446).
(ii): As we said in (5) above: Lewis also discusses what to say in cases where there is not
a unique realization, or more than one. (Indeed, we now know that in the Maxwell example,
there is more than one realizer of the functional role, ‘travels at ca. 3 × 105 km s−1’: gravi-
tational influence, as well as light.) But in this paper, we can skip these complications, since
our three projects give ‘clean’ examples—of time having a functional definition, and a reduction.
1.4 How the projects illustrate functionalist reduction
To prepare for these projects and to summarise this Section, we end by stating the trio of
claims that will be the analogues of premises i) and ii) and the conclusion iii) above. Indeed,
we will do this twice: first, in general, indeed vague, terms, so as to fit equally well all three
projects; and then, in more specific terms that differ between the projects.
Note that our giving both a general trio, and more specific trios, is not a matter of indecision.
For our functionalist reductive perspective is a philosophical template that can be brought
into contact with the scientific details in various ways. And we think there need be no—
there probably is no—fact of the matter about which among the various precise Tt one could
diligently extract from e.g. Hojman et al. (1976) is the best, or the right, Tt to fix on as
providing a functional definition of the time parameter (a definition that is then realized by
properties mentioned by a corresponding Hamiltonian ‘bottom theory’ Tb).
So first, the general version. As we have said, the problematic property (the T -term) that is
to be given a functional definition and reduction (the analogue of pain) is time. More precisely:
it is duration, or the temporal metric. For in the ‘3+1’ framework of this paper, the unification
of the temporal metric with the spatial metric in a Lorentz-signature metric—in physical terms:
the relativity of simultaneity—will be ‘in the background’. In other words: although Lorentz-
invariance will hold good (and be postulated or derived in diverse ways: reviewed in Section
1.2), it will not be prominent.
The main idea of the temporal metric’s functional role, as it would be spelt out in a Tt,
is that time is the measure, the parameterisation, of change. Stated as simply as that, the
idea has a very long pedigree: from Aristotle through Descartes to McTaggart’s insistence
that ‘time involves change’ McTaggart (1908, p. 459). But for us, the idea is of course more
specific: time is to parameterise changes of spatial geometry, and its rate of ticking should in
some sense mesh appropriately with the amounts of those changes. Thus the analogue of ‘being
typically caused by tissue damage and typically causing distress and aversive behaviour’ will
be along the lines: ‘being related in an appropriate way to spatial geometry—including to how
it changes over time’. Here, the last phrase, ‘changes over time’, signals—as does the mental
term ‘distress’, in the pain example—that in general, a T -term’s functional role involves other
T -terms. But as discussed: using other T -terms does not give any problem of a logical circle.
So much by way of Tt (and thus premise i)). For the general version of Tb, i.e. the analogue
of neurophysiology (and so premise ii)’s C-fibre firing), we suggest: the general features of a
Hamiltonian theory of geometrodynamics. This will characterize time by: (i) its appearing in
the denominator of the right-hand-side of equations {H,ϕ} = d
dt
ϕ, governing the relevant fields
ϕ; and thus implicitly by (ii) the symplectic flow of (or Poisson bracket with) the Hamiltonian
in the left-hand-side.
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We turn to the specific versions, one for each project. Of course, the details mentioned
here (for example, the first project’s deformation and constraint algebras) will become clearer
in the following Sections.
• (1): Hojman et al. (1976): Here one can take Tt as the theory of (globally hyperbolic)
Lorentzian spacetimes, and the functional role of time (or rather: of elapsed time, du-
ration) to be defined by the relative evolution of spacelike hypersurfaces, and its being
required to obey the deformation algebra. One can take Tb to be the Hamiltonian theory,
whose constraint algebra realizes the deformation algebra. Thus in terms of Lewis’ nota-
tion, τ and ρ, introduced above: the Tt-term τ (the analogue of ‘being in pain’) equals:
the generator of how spatial geometry changes over time, that reproduces the assumed
deformation algebra of hypersurfaces. And the Tb-term ρ (the analogue of ‘C-fibre firing’)
equals: the ADM Hamiltonian. In this way, Hojman et al.’s theorem, their uniqueness
result, can be written as the Lewisian bridge-law: τ = ρ.
• (2): The programme of Schuller et al.: Here it is clearest to express reduction in two
stages, corresponding to the earlier work, reviewed in Schuller (2011) and then the later
work, revised with more modern techniques in Du¨ll et al. (2018). The first stage is the
functionalist reduction of a theory about chrono-geometry to a theory about matter and
radiation. The second stage develops the theory of gravity, considered as the evolution
of a 3-geometry coupled to the first stage’s dynamics of matter and radiation. The
bridge between the stages is a set of consistency conditions, called ‘gravitational closure
equations’: which Schuller et al. show can be satisfied.
In the first stage, i.e. the functionalist reduction, one takes Tt as a theory of 4-dimensional
manifolds, not equipped with any metric, but equipped with matter-or-radiation fields
whose equations of motion obey conditions about predictivity, good behaviour and being
deduced from a diffeomorphism-invariant action functional. Then Tb is a framework
for generalized Lorentzian geometries: geometries that possess a generalized metric (not
necessarily a contravariant tensor of rank two), by which we can identify causal cones,
a future and past direction, and spacelike (in effect: Cauchy) hypersurfaces. Section 3
will give some details. The broad result is that again, from Tt one could extract the
functional role of the time parameter, along the lines that time is “the dimension along
which we make predictions”: although, owing to the details, it would certainly be more
cumbersome to state exactly than is the role extracted from Hojman et al.’s Tt.
This leads to the consistency conditions, the gravitational closure equations. Thus in
their second stage, Schuller et al. adopt the ‘3+1’ framework; and thereby connect to
the technical apparatus of project (1), equating the commutation algebra between the
Hamiltonian generators with that of the hypersurface deformation. As we announced in
Section 1.2: using this apparatus, Schuller et al. show that the consistency conditions
are indeed satisfied by classical electromagnetism, with the resulting evolution of spatial
geometry being described by the ADM Hamiltonian.
Thus in this case at least, we can conclude that, with τ expressing the (admittedly cum-
bersome) functional role gestured at by the slogan that time is “the dimension along
which we make predictions” and with ρ being again the ADM Hamiltonian: the func-
tionalist reduction is again summed up by the Lewisian bridge law, τ = ρ.
• (3): Gomes & Shyam (2016): In this project, one begins with only a 3-dimensional
Riemannian manifold, and the general (“philosophical”) idea above that its geometry
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changes. So although one assumes that time is the dimension of change, one does not
assume that it forms a dimension of a spacetime manifold. Accordingly, Tt is a “pre-
relativistic” theory about the time-evolution of causally unrelated quantities: quantities
encoding facts about local geometry. Then time, understood as the measure of the local
changes of these quantities (as elapsed time, duration), is functionally defined by the
different local measures of change being required to commute in the appropriate way.
(Details in Section 4.) And Tb is an avowedly Hamiltonian theory (as it was in projects
(1) and (2)). It is a theory that implements, or realizes, the ideas of Tt in a phase
space formalism, subject to certain assumptions such as the Hamiltonian being at most
second-order in momenta.
These conditions are rich enough to imply (with hard work!) that the Hamiltonian is the
ADM one. So as for projects (1) and (2): with τ expressing the functional role of time
given by the Tt and with ρ once again the ADM Hamiltonian, the functionalist reduction
can be summed up by the Lewisian bridge-law: τ = ρ.
2 Realizing the temporal metric—from geometrodynamics
We turn to project (1): ‘Geometrodynamics regained’ by Hojman, Kuchar and Teitelboim, in
Annals of Physics, 1976; Hojman et al. (1976). For us this work is significant, not only as an
important illustration of functionalist reduction in a spacetime theory; but also because (as we
mentioned in Section 1.2) some of its apparatus is also used in projects (2) and (3). Following
the ‘Tt and Tb’ pattern of functionalist reduction, we present: in Section 2.1, this project’s
Tt, essentially the hypersurface deformation algebra; and in Section 2.2, its Tb, essentially
the constraint algebra. We state the uniqueness result for (the characterization of) the ADM
Hamiltonian Arnowitt et al. (1962) as Theorem 1.
Of course, we will not display the entire proof here. That is not to our purpose; and anyway,
its original exposition is very clear. But we will see, in the second half of Section 2.2, that
their result can be parsed as amounting to two main achievements. The first, which we have
already articulated, finds phase space functions whose algebra recovers the hypersurface com-
mutation algebra. The second, by demanding that there is an algebra homomorphism between
the constraints and the deformation vectors, guarantees that these phase space functions are
actually constrained. (Cf. Corollary 1 in Section 2.2.) We will be interested in the second of
these, since the apparatus involved will be deployed again in Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 Hypersurface deformations
Hojman et al. assume a 4-dimensional Lorentzian manifold M , but adopt a ‘3+1’ perspective.
So they consider a 3-dimensional spatial manifold, which we will here call Σ. They assume it
is compact and without boundary, and consider its embeddings as spacelike hypersurfaces of
M .
Specifically, suppose a foliation of spacetime by spacelike surfaces exists: X : R× Σ→M .
In this notation, X takes a given σ ∈ Σ to an entire worldline (these are the points with the
same spatial coordinate) and a given t to an entire hypersurface. Given a spacetime metric,
gµν , with signature (−,+,+,+), at any point X(σ, t′), the tangent to this worldline can be
decomposed in normal and tangential directions to the hypersurface:
X˙t′ :=
d
dt |t=t′
Xt(σ) = Nn + s =: (N, s)(x) =: (X˙t′⊥, X˙t′‖)(x) (2.1)
where x = Xt′(σ) denotes the base spacetime point for the vector, N is called the lapse, s is
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Figure 1: The foliation of spacetime, induced by a one-parameter family of embeddings of
the model spatial manifold, Σ. The coordinates on Σ are denoted by σi, and those on M are
denoted by xµ. (Taken from arxiv, with permission; from Dull et al, 2018.)
the spatial vector field called the shift,12; and in the last two equalities we represented this
spacetime vector in a doublet with its normal and parallel components to the hypersurface.
There is a representation of Diff(M) onto the embedding maps, Emb(Σ,M) (an infinite-
dimensional space of mappings). That is, any spacetime diffeomorphism d ∈ Diff(M), d : p 7→
d(p), defines a map, ∆d,Σ, on Emb(Σ,M), as follows. If p = X(t, σ) ∈ M , then d defines
another embedding (i.e. another member of Emb(Σ,M)), viz. d ◦X. Thus:
∆d,Σ : X 7→ d ◦X
is a diffeomorphism of the infinite dimensional manifold Emb(Σ,M). Correspondingly, a vector
field ξ, being an infinitesimal generator of diffeomorphisms on M , defines an infinitesimal
generator D(ξ) of diffeomorphisms on Emb(Σ,M); i.e. a vector field on Emb(Σ,M); the map:
ξ 7→ D(ξ) is a Lie algebra homomorphism. We only have good control over the infinitesimal
version of the embedding maps (and of the hypersurface deformation algebra below), and we
will thus only work at that, infinitesimal, level.13
Thus proceeding at the infinitesimal level, on one side of this homomorphism, using the
spacetime metric on M , we can decompose a vector field ξ into components normal and parallel
to the leaves of the hypersurface, ξ = (ξ⊥, ξ‖), with ξ⊥ a scalar and ξ‖ a spatial vector field.
Then with ξ1, ξ2 vector fields, [D(ξ1), D(ξ2)] = D([ξ1, ξ2]) yields Teitelboim (1973):
[D(ξ1⊥, ξ
1
‖), D(ξ
2
⊥, ξ
2
‖)] = D(ξ
3
⊥, ξ
3
‖) (2.2)
where
ξ3⊥(ξ
1, ξ2) = ξ1‖[ξ
2
⊥]− ξ2‖[ξ1⊥] (2.3)
ξ3‖(ξ
1, ξ2) = [ξ1‖, ξ
2
‖]− 
(
ξ2⊥h
−1(dξ1⊥)− ξ1⊥h−1(dξ2⊥)
)
(2.4)
where  = ±1 is the spacetime signature—it is − for Euclidean and + for Lorentzian—and we
have used coordinate-free notation (e.g. ξ1‖[ξ
2
⊥] = ξ
1i
‖∂iξ
2
⊥, and ξ
2
⊥h
−1(dξ1⊥) = ξ
2
⊥h
ij∂iξ
1
⊥, where
hij is the pull-back of gµν to the hypersurface).
12We have deviated slightly from the usual notation, in which the shift is also, somewhat confusingly from
the 3+1 point of view, denoted by N, or, in components, N i.
13 The reason is that it is difficult to control the signature of the embedding after the application of a
diffeomorphism. If we apply a diffeomorphism to a given spacelike embedding there is no guarantee that
the hypersurface remains spacelike. Nonetheless, under infinitesimal diffeomorphisms (i.e. vector fields) an
originally spacelike embedding will remain spacelike, since being spacelike is an open condition: the normal nx
must be timelike at any point x, i.e. gx(nx,nx) < 0, which is an open condition. Thanks to Klaas Landsman
for this point.
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Essentially, (2.2) gives the orthogonal decomposition of the commutator of (orthogonally
decomposed) vector fields. It has a simple geometrical meaning: one is first deforming the
leaves of the foliation one way (ξ1) and then another (ξ2), and then comparing that resulting
foliation with one in which the opposite ordering of deformations was applied. Suppose that
the first vector field deforms the hypersurface Σ into Σ1, then deforming that surface with ξ
2 we
obtain Σ12, i.e. Σ −→ Σ1 −→ Σ12. The commutator [D(ξ1⊥, ξ1‖ ), D(ξ2⊥, ξ2‖ )] is the deformation
map between Σ12 and Σ21.
The insight of Hojman, Kuchar and Teitelboim was to require that the hypersurface evo-
lution given by D is matched by the geometrodynamical evolution given by the Hamiltonian.
2.2 Commutation algebras translated into constraint algebras
The standard notation for the phase space variables—the metric on a space-like hypersurface
and its conjugate momentum—is (hab(σ), pi
ab(σ)), (the explicit dependence on space via the
label σ reminds us that this is a pair of canonically conjugate variables per space point in
an infinite dimensional phase space). So, at each point σ ∈ Σ and before the imposition
of constraints, we have twelve phase space dimensions as both the metric and its conjugate
momentum are symmetric tensors.
We will denote the canonical Poisson brackets as {·, ·}, which, when applied to the funda-
mental phase space conjugate variables (hab(σ), pi
ab(σ)) yields
{hab(σ), picd(σ′)} = δ(ca δd)b δ(σ − σ′).
for σ, σ′ ∈ Σ. Note that by δ(x− y) we really mean δ(3)(σ−σ′). Thus the action of the Poisson
brackets on arbitrary phase space functions (omitting indices) F (g(σ), pi(σ)) and P (g(σ′), pi(σ′))
is given by:
{F (h(σ), pi(σ)), P (h(σ′), pi(σ′))} =
∫
d3σ′′
(
δF (σ)
δhab(σ′′)
δP (σ′)
δpiab(σ′′)
− δP (σ
′)
δhab(σ′′)
δF (σ)
δpiab(σ′)
)
.
To obtain their uniqueness result, Hojman et al. assume the total Hamiltonian for gravity
is a sum:
H (ξ⊥, ξ‖) =H⊥(ξ⊥) +H‖(ξ‖) (2.5)
with
H‖(ξ‖) :=
∫
d3σ ξi‖(σ)H‖i[h, pi;σ) and H⊥(ξ⊥) :=
∫
d3σ ξ⊥(σ)H⊥[h, pi;σ).
where we have used DeWitt’s mixed index notation: F [pi, h;σ) may depend on the phase space
data (and their derivatives) at each spatial point σ. Hojman et al. then require that the
constraint algebra reproduces the deformation algebra:{
H (ξ1⊥, ξ
1
‖),H (ξ
2
⊥, ξ
2
‖)
}
=H (ξ3⊥, ξ
3
‖) (2.6)
with (ξ3⊥, ξ
3
‖) obeying (2.3) and (2.4).
They also assume:
(1) The generator of spatial diffeomorphisms is (with ∇ the Levi-Civita covariant derivative
associated to hij)
H‖i[h, pi;σ) :=
(
hkj∇kpiij
)
(σ). (2.7)
That is: {
hij(σ),
∫
dσ′ ξ`
(∇kpi`k) (σ′)} = Lξhij(σ) ,
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with the same holding for piij. They also assume
(2) The scalar generator H⊥[h, pi;σ) is such that:{∫
d3σ ξ⊥(σ)H⊥[h, pi;σ) , hij(σ)
}
≡ {H⊥(ξ⊥), hij(σ)} = 2(ξ⊥Kij)(σ) (2.8)
where Kij is the extrinsic curvature of the embedded hypersurface in M . This is motivated by
requiring H⊥[h, pi;σ) to generate diffeomorphisms normal to the leaves of the foliation.
With these assumptions, they then prove:
Theorem 1 (HKT) Under assumptions (2.6),(2.7), and (2.8), the unique choice ofH⊥[h, pi;σ)
is:
H⊥[h, pi;σ) =HADM⊥[hab, piab;σ) :=
(
a
piabpiab − 12pi2√
h
− a−1(R− 2Λ)
√
h
)
(σ) (2.9)
where a and Λ are arbitrary constants.
This is a remarkable uniqueness result. It entirely fixes the form of the generators of tangential
and normal diffeomorphisms.
But condition (2.8) requires some justification, both technically and conceptually. First,
technically: it requires the absence of terms containing derivatives of the momenta in the pure-
normal part of the Hamiltonian. In fact, H⊥[h, pi;σ) is assumed to be a polynomial, ultralocal
functional of piab. Conceptually, the assumption has a physical meaning inherited from space-
time intuitions. Namely, it encodes the fact thatH⊥[h, pi;σ), or equivalently,H (ξ⊥, 0), should
represent an infinitesimal diffeomorphism normal to the leaves, i.e. a normal deformation in
the spacetime embedding. Of course, this expectation is alien to the Hamiltonian vocabulary,
and thus must be imported from the spacetime domain.
But arriving at (2.9) does not yet show that these generators are constrained, i.e. that
they are generators of symmetries. The total Hamiltonian of General Relativity is a sum of
four constraints, the scalar Hamiltonian constraint (one per point) and the vector diffeomor-
phism constraint (three per point). These constraints, together with their Poisson algebra,
encapsulate the initial value problem, the gauge symmetries and the evolution of the theory.
But here we have so far only described H (ξ⊥, ξ‖) as a symplectic generator of evolution, or
of the hypersurface deformations. We have not yet discussed the reason for constraining these
generators to be zero on-shell.
This further restriction can still be extracted by imposing not only that the constraint
algebra is the same as the deformation algebra, but that the algebra homomorphism works
also at the level of generators of symplectic transformations. That is: the geometrodynamical
evolution matches the geometrical deformation of surfaces.
For that, we want to demand that:
{{•,H (ξ1)},H (ξ2)} − {{•,H (ξ2)},H (ξ1)} ≈ {•,H }(ξ3) (2.10)
where: ξ3 is the commutator given in (2.3) and (2.4), the last equality need hold only on-shell,
• stands for any phase space functional, and we abbreviate, e.g.
{•,H⊥} (ξ⊥) =
∫
d3σ ξ⊥(σ) {•,H⊥[h, pi;σ)}{•,H‖} (ξ‖) = ∫ d3σ ξ‖i(σ){•,H‖i[h, pi;σ)} . (2.11)
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For phase-space-independent smearings, there is no difference according to where we place
the Poisson brackets. But since the commutation algebra produces field-dependence, one must
distinguish the two. What we mean by an evolution by a parameter ξ is the latter, i.e. (2.11),
where the parameter is placed outside the Poisson bracket.
Using the Jacobi identity and (2.6) we have:{{•,H (ξ1⊥, ξ1‖)} ,H (ξ2⊥, ξ2‖)}− {{•,H (ξ2⊥, ξ2‖)} ,H (ξ1⊥, ξ1‖)} = {•,H (ξ3⊥, ξ3‖)} . (2.12)
But as can be seen from (2.4),
ξ3‖ = [ξ
1
‖, ξ
2
‖]− 
(
ξ2⊥h
−1(dξ1⊥)− ξ1⊥h−1(dξ2⊥)
)
clearly contains the metric hij; (equation (2.3) does not).
Therefore, from (2.12), we would obtain:{•,H (ξ3⊥, ξ3‖)} = {•,H } (ξ3⊥, ξ3‖) +H‖({•, ξ3‖}) . (2.13)
From this, we can clearly see that the last term in (2.13) is the obstruction to obtaining (2.10).
Note also that the last term is not an infinitesimal diffeomorphism of •. In fact, it will only
have an effect on the momenta of •, since ξ3‖ only contains the metric. Therefore, for the
Hamiltonian evolution to mesh in the right way, we must demand that, on-shell (in practice,
‘on-shell’ means, implementing equality after taking all functional derivatives, i.e. calculating
all the Poisson brackets):
H‖(ξ‖) ≈ 0, ∀ξ‖ ∈ C∞(TΣ) or equivalently H i‖ [h, pi;σ) ≈ 0 ; (2.14)
where on-shell equality is denoted by a ≈. But to be conserved, this condition will also imply
the vanishing of H⊥:{
H⊥(ξ1⊥),H‖(ξ
2
‖)
}
=H⊥(ξ2‖[ξ
1
⊥]) ≈ 0, ∀ξ2‖ ∈ C∞(TΣ),∀ξ1⊥ ∈ C∞(Σ) .
Therefore, the final condition required to obtain general relativity in its ADM form from
Theorem 2.9 is (2.10); or, assuming (2.6) (and using the Jacobi identity), the required condition
is: {•,H (ξ3⊥, ξ3‖)} ≈ {•,H } (ξ3⊥, ξ3‖) (2.15)
where ξ may have phase-space-dependence (in the example above, ξ = ξ3 had a specific depen-
dence on the metric, as a result of the commutation algebra).
Mathematically, this condition is necessary to ensure that we can interpret the mapping of
the deformation vectors into a lapse and shift as a homomorphism from the algebraic structure
of hypersurface deformations into the derivations of phase-space functions, i.e. as Hamiltonian
evolution. That is:, we want to guarantee that the successive evolution by a pair of parameters
stays within the same phase-space solution curve, irrespective of their ordering. Hojman et
al. interpret this demand as encoding the “path-independence” of the evolution of geometrical
quantities—the irrelevance of the intermediate foliations Hojman et al. (1976, Sec. 5).
Thus we can now state:
Corollary 1 Under assumptions (2.10),(2.7), and (2.8) (that is, replacing (2.6) by the stronger
(2.10)) we obtain ADM Hamiltonian geometrodynamics.
Once one has recovered foliation invariance, and all that comes with it, the closure of the brack-
ets translates back in covariant language to the Bianchi identities. The geometrodynamical
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coupling of matter then follows suit: it corresponds to the Legendre transform of a generally
covariant matter theory coupled to a general relativistic spacetime.14
Note that, since it is only the normal components of the two diffeomorphisms that form
the obstruction in (2.13), we can state path-independence employing only equivalence through
spatial diffeomorphisms. That is, for ‘pure’ time evolution, setting the parallel components of
ξ to zero, one must demand only that the geometry of Σ12 is the same as that of Σ21 (i.e. that
they differ by the action of a spatial diffeomorphism). Of all of the principles of Hojman et al’s
reconstruction, only this weaker ‘path-independence’, or meshing condition, will be imported
into the non-spacetime-based theorems of Section 4.
3 Realizing the temporal metric—from matter without geometry
We turn to project (2): the programme of Schuller and his collaborators Du¨ll et al. (2018);
Schuller (2011) to recover chrono-geometry, specifically, geometrodynamics, from postulates
about the physics of (massive or massless) matter fields defined on a 4-dimensional manifold,
but without assuming ab initio a Lorentzian metric. This is clearly a programme that is both
ambitious and avowedly ‘relationist’. So it deserves the attention of philosophers of physics,
especially those sympathetic to relationism (e.g. the dynamical approach of Brown (2006)).15
All the more so, since the programme has been developed in detail and has achieved a great
deal. But our discussion of it must be limited: we will confine ourselves to showing how the
programme illustrates, not just reduction, but our preferred functionalist reduction.
As we said at the end of Section 1.4, it is best to think of the reduction in two stages.
We give an overview of both stages in Section 3.1, then give their details (Sections 3.2 and
3.3 respectively). Finally, in Section 3.4, we will sketch an example showing the programme’s
dependence on assuming diffeomorphism invariance (as we announced in Section 1.2).
3.1 Overview of the two stages of reduction
The broad idea is that the various familiar roles that the Lorentzian metric plays in relativistic
physics are to be replaced by, indeed reduced to, conditions on matter and radiation: conditions
that are less problematic from a relationist viewpoint. However, Schuller et al. do assume from
the start: a 4-dimensional manifold, and that the equations of motion for matter and radiation
are deduced from a fully diffeomorphism-invariant action functional. (So this precludes certain
theories that take a fundamentally 3+1 perspective—theories such as shape dynamics Gomes
et al. (2011); Gomes & Koslowski (2012) and Horava-Lifschitz gravity Horava (2009).)
Their first stage then consists of adding some reasonable assumptions about these equations
(details below), and deducing that spacetime has a causal structure and, indeed, a generalized
geometry. More precisely: they deduce that there are well-defined future and past causal cones
(limiting the speed of causal propagation) at each point, and this yields definitions of timelike
trajectories and spatial—or rather, Cauchy—hypersurfaces, as well as mass hyperbolas. We
will call this a kinematical geometry.16 Then the second stage requires that both the matter
and the geometry of a spacetime canonically evolve together, starting and ending on shared
Cauchy surfaces, and independently of the intermediate foliation. This requirement means a set
of consistency conditions, called ‘gravitational closure equations’, must be satisfied. Schuller
14Nonetheless, the consistent propagation of matter can also be obtained in the canonically 3+1 language,
as above.
15But so far as we know, the only philosophical discussion of it is Menon (2021), which we commend.
16Although this is our label, not these authors’, it is prompted by some of their phrases like ‘kinematical
meaning’ in the next quotation.
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et al. then deploy a version of the apparatus of Hojman et al, i.e. project (1) of Section 2—
suitably generalized to their kinematical geometries—to show that classical electromagnetism
satisfies these consistency conditions. Thus they recover orthodox geometrodynamics, i.e. the
orthodox general relativistic canonical co-evolution of the Maxwell field and spatial geometry—
without having assumed ab initio a Lorentzian metric! Clearly, this is a major achievement,
even though it is restricted to classical electromagnetism; (so that in philosophers’ jargon, it is
a local reduction).
These two stages are summarised successively in the introduction to Du¨ll et al. (2018); and
this is followed by a remark which reminds us of the dynamical approach of Brown (2006):
“[We first prescribe] the matter dynamics on a spacetime. The dynamics of the un-
derpinning spacetime geometry are then shown to follow from the matter dynamics,
essentially by a sufficiently precise requirement of common canonical evolution ...
the matter dynamics crucially determines the kinematical meaning of their geomet-
ric background [i.e. first stage], and it is precisely this information that directly
funnels into the structure of the gravitational dynamics [i.e. second stage]. ...
And [this is] not a new perspective either, considering that it was the dynamics of
matter, namely the classical electromagnetic field, that led Einstein to the identifi-
cation and kinematical interpretation of Lorentzian geometries and finally the field
equations for their dynamics [cf. the dynamical approach].” (2018: Introduction,
p. 084036-1)
We end this Section with a couple of details and quotations, about the first stage. At the
start, one assumes three conditions about the matter: (technically, conditions on the principal
polynomial of the corresponding field equations). In the authors’ words Du¨ll et al. (2018):
“Classically [these three conditions] correspond, in turn, to: the existence of an
initial value formulation for the matter field equations; a one-to-one relation be-
tween momenta and velocities of massless particles; the requirement of an observer-
independent definition of positive particle energy. It is interesting to note that if
one insists on the matter field equations being canonically quantizable, these three
properties are directly implied.” (2018: Introduction, p. 084036-2)
Moreover, one assumes that the equations of motion are obtained from extremising a
diffeomorphism-invariant action functional Smatter. As we will see, this second assumption
is central. For one thing, it means assuming that there is some spacetime density or volume-
form, i.e. some way to count infinitesimal volume—which will be a “seed” for metrical relations.
And one assumes that additional to the matter degrees of freedom, there is a tensor G on the
spacetime, that is constrained only by how it enters the action—through the volume-form for
example, and perhaps by how it contracts indices of derivatives or tensor indices of the matter
fields. (So nothing about the signature, or tensor valence, of G is assumed: it could be given
by a symplectic-form, or by a four-valence tensor contracting area-elements, etc.)
G is called a geometric tensor; though in the absence of the other assumptions, it will in
general not define a causal structure or other geometrical notions. (So while ‘G’ naturally
stands for ‘geometry’, one might also think of it as standing for ‘gadget’ !) But the three
conditions on matter fields are then translated into conditions on dispersion relations which, in
their turn, are encoded in a totally symmetric contravariant even-rank tensor field, satisfying
three simple algebraic conditions. One can then identify much of the structure, such as a causal
(cone) structure, usually associated with there being a Lorentzian metric—even though one
has not assumed such a metric. In Schuller’s words:
“These physically inevitable properties single-handedly ensure that the entire kine-
matical apparatus familiar from physics on a Lorentzian manifold is defined in
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precisely the same way for any spacetime; causality, in particular, is perfectly com-
patible with superluminal propagation in spacetimes, but one only learns this from
a subtle interplay of convex analysis, real algebraic geometry and the modern theory
of partial differential equations.” Schuller (2011, p.2 )
Then it turns out that whatever the geometric tensor G, and whatever the matter fields (as
long as they satisfy the assumed conditions), a set of consistency conditions on the deduced
spacetime structure must be satisfied—leading into the second stage.17
3.2 Kinematical geometry from matter dynamics
As we have admitted, a detailed account of this programme would go far beyond this paper: a
summary of the general ideas must suffice. The starting assumption is the action for matter or
radiation, described by a tensorial field B on the spacetime manifold M , which is ultralocally
coupled to a “geometric” tensor field, G. G is of arbitrary tensor valence. It is needed at least
to form scalar densities of weight one (i.e. ensuring diffeomorphism invariance for Smatter), but
it can also be used to contract indices of the same valence:18
Smatter[B;G) =
∫
d4xLmatter(B, ∂(K)B;G(x)) (3.1)
where ∂KB denotes dependence on an arbitrary but finite number of derivatives of B, i.e. from
∂iB to ∂i1 · · · ∂iFB. From this action, it is assumed that the equations of motion for B are of
the form:
Qi1···ınAB (G(x))(∂i1 · · · ∂iFBA)(x) +O(∂F−1B) = 0 . (3.2)
In this equation, A,B denote the tensor indices of the matter field. Qi1···ınAB (G(x)) is a tensor
density of weight one by itself, functionally dependent on the geometric tensor. Despite the
appearance of partial—not covariant—derivatives, by ignoring the lower order terms (where
the non-covariant terms would appear), (3.2) is made appropriately covariant. It is important
that the equations of motion are linear in the field B, for otherwise one cannot isolate the
implications of the dynamics for the causal structure.19
While the deduction of the “felt” spacetime properties from Q is not at all straightforward,
we can illustrate the gist of it with a simple example: consider the Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin
expansion of the matter field:
BA(x) = exp (iS(x)/λ)(bA +O(λ)) .
Then, from applying the equations of motion, to lowest order we obtain:
Qi1···ınAB (G(x))ki1 · · · kiF bA = 0
17In general terms, it is unsurprising that there should be such consistency conditions. Recall that in the
covariant framework, Lovelock’s theorem Lovelock (1971) severely restricts the possible Lagrangian densities
for the gravitational part of the action. Agreed: that theorem assumes that the “felt” spacetime metric is the
standard Lorentzian metric gµν : without that assumption, the theorem does not apply, and one must seek more
general theorems constraining the gravitational part of the action. But instead of seeking a generalized version
of Lovelock’s theorem, Schu¨ller et al. adopt the alternative, canonical framework, and so can invoke known
consistency requirements, drawing on Section 2.
18Here we are supposing a single geometric tensor. In Du¨ll et al. (2018), it is shown how to incorporate
multiple G’s.
19The terminology ‘probing matter’, as introduced in Schuller (2011, p. 12-13), signifies matter with linear
equations of motion. As he describes it, with non-linear equations “it would often be impossible to disentangle
the properties of the matter field from properties of the underlying geometry”.
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which precisely captures the infinite frequency limit of the fields. Of course, these equations
need not define anything like the causal cones of standard Lorentzian metrics: for starters, here
the ki’s are momenta, and must be (Legendre) transformed into vectors to constitute elements
of spacetime. It is part of the merit of Schuller (2011) to show that in fact they do define
causal cones—when (3.2) satisfy the necessary conditions.
Generalizing the manipulation of Q above, one defines the principal polynomial, which
carries most of the dynamical significance of the equations of motion:20
P (x, k) = ±ρ det
A,B
(
Qi1···ınAB (G(x))ki1 · · · kiF
)
If the (linear, partial differential) equations of motion have a well-posed initial value-problem,
then P (x, k) defines a hyperbolic homogeneous polynomial in each cotangent space, T ∗xM ,
where ρ is a scalar density obtained from G. Here, the polynomial is called ‘hyperbolic’ if there
is a covector k ∈ T ∗xM such that P (x, k) 6= 0 and the equation P (x, p + λk) = 0 has only real
solutions for λ, for any further covector p ∈ T ∗xM .
This way of describing P leads directly to the definition of hyperbolicity cones, which are
the seeds for defining the causal structure of the theory directly from the equations of motion,
and which in fact generalize the familiar causal cones in Lorentzian geometry.21 Namely, for
each such k, there is always an open and convex cone Cx(P ; k) that contains all hyperbolic
covectors that lie together with k in one connected set. It is a cone not in the geometric
sense per se, but algebraically: for every k′ ∈ Cx(P ; k), we have Cx(P ; k′) = Cx(P ; k), and
for k′, k′′ ∈ C(P, k), λk′ ∈ C(P, k) and k′ + k′′ ∈ C(P, k). To render it geometrical, one must
convert cotangent vectors to vectors.
Another distinguishing feature (which we will not delve into), is that in the generalized
case, the dual polynomial (e.g. defining the causal structure through vectors instead of co-
vectors) may not even be completely well-defined.22 In fact, finding the dual polynomial is
instrumental for a proper Legendre transformation of the matter-induced dynamical structure
(such as ‘observer worldlines’). A Legendre map L is essentially the spacetime gradient (at the
base point) of lnP (x, k), that is: Lx : Cx → TxM : k 7→ −gradx(lnP )(x, k). It is well-defined
and exists when P is bi-hyperbolic and energy-distinguishing. Such a Legendre map will take
elements of the hyperbolicity cone Cx to elements of TxM . In this case, one can move from
dynamical structures in the cotangent spaces T ∗M to structures in TM and, eventually, to
structures in spacetime M . For instance, for ‘an observer’ curve, whose tangent γ˙ is always
within the observer cone C]x, the vector space Vx(γ˙) := {X ∈ TxM : L−1(γ˙)(X) = 0} defines
the purely spatial directions as seen by such an observer.23
Proceeding in this manner—though we should note that this construction does not directly
provide a Lorentzian spacetime metric—one is ultimately able with hard labour to use the
dynamics to identify spatial hypersurfaces, temporal directions, momenta, observer trajectories,
observer frames, particle energies, etc.
20More care is needed in the presence of gauge symmetries, but that case too is encompassed by the framework
of Du¨ll et al. (2018).
21For higher order polynomials, one gets an even number of distinct hyperbolicity cones, but not necessarily
two, as in Lorentzian geometry. Importantly, this discrepancy does not block general dynamical considerations;
and in many cases, there are work-arounds. For instance, for reducible polynomials (i.e. forming many null
directions, since P (x) = P1(x) · · ·Pn(x)), one obtains the overall hyperbolicity cone by intersection.
22A dual principal polynomial to P at x is any principal polynomial P ]x that acts on the tangent space and
annihilates tangents to the bases of null cones of P . That is, let the causal cones (in cotangent space) be defined
as Nx := {k ∈ T ∗xM : P (x, k) = 0}, with smooth subcones defined by N smoothx := {k ∈ Nx : gradxP (x, k) 6= 0}.
Then P ]x : TxM → R is defined by P ]x(gradx(N smoothx )) = 0. Then P is bi-hyperbolic if both P and P ] are
hyperbolic; and similarly: for Cx, one can define C
]
x.
23Although Schuller in Schuller (2011) uses different maps for the null cone and the time-like trajectories—the
Gauss map and the Legendre map, respectively—this is not strictly necessary to build a geometry in the sense
above, and the distinction is indeed dropped from the later papers in the series.
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In sum, the great merit of this programme Du¨ll et al. (2018); Giesel et al. (2012); Schuller
(2011) is that it builds a causal spacetime notion directly from the dynamics of matter. But
it is not true that ‘anything goes’. For even after satisfying the conditions on the matter
equations, consistency conditions emerge once one couples the dynamics of matter to the
auxiliary geometrical structures, G—leading us to the second stage.
3.3 Geometrodynamics from kinematical geometry
The equations of motion also bequeath spatial geometric structure to the spacelike surfaces
and temporal geometric structure to the remaining, causal directions. More precisely: the
existence and uniqueness of the way to associate normal directions along a hypersurface with
its canonical normal co-directions by means of a Legendre map requires all three algebraic
properties: the hyperbolicity, time-orientability and energy-distinguishing properties.
But once we have such surfaces and their orthogonal directions, one can deform the hyper-
surfaces, either orthogonally to the surfaces, or parallel to them. Applying such deformations
in succession, one can construct a purely geometric hypersurface deformation algebra, as seen
in section 2, and equation (2.2) (see Teitelboim (1973)).
With these algebras in hand, we can apply a generalized form of the Hojman-Kuchar-
Teitelboim (HKT) procedure Hojman et al. (1976), also described in section 2, by which one
defines Hamiltonian generators in the gravitational phase space. These generators are designed
to recover the action of the hypersurface deformations, and are thus thought, in some sense,
to generate spacetime diffeomorphisms.
In sum, the procedure consists in the following steps. First, we use the dynamically-
induced causal structure to define not only the spatial hypersurfaces, but also its associated
normal vectors in the time direction. Then, one obtains a hypersurface deformation algebra
by decomposing general spacetime vector fields in terms of this foliation. This need not match
the standard metric spacetime hypersurface commutation algebra; the difference is due to the
kinematical information in the construction of the hypersurfaces. Thus, upon computing the
hypersurface deformation algebra, only the pure time-time component can differ from (2.3)
and (2.4):
[D⊥(ξ1⊥), D⊥(ξ
2
⊥)] =H‖
(
K[Q]ij(ξ1⊥∂iξ
2
⊥ − ξ2⊥∂iξ1⊥)
)
(3.3)
The tensor K[Q]ij is defined implicitly by Q (see eq 45 and 48 in Du¨ll et al. (2018)). It is only
in this dynamical relation that the equations of motion make an appearance.
In parallel, using the ‘gadget’ geometrical tensor G, one can find the induced geometrical
structure on these spatial hypersurfaces—call these φ(σ) for σ ∈ Σ, the spatial hypersurface—
and a corresponding phase space for these quantities—labelling as pi(σ) the associated conju-
gate momenta to φ(σ) (the actual definition is also laborious, and involves again the principal
polynomial). Finally, one requires that the hypersurface deformation generators be emulated
in the phase space, by respective Hamiltonian generators. That is, equating the commutation
algebra between the Hamiltonian generators with that of the hypersurface deformation, one
obtains further consistency conditions—this time on the geometrodynamical part of the action.
In a nut-shell, the matter dynamics in this way restricts the geometrodynamics of any model
embedded in a spacetime manifold.
Finally, two last conditions, in the spirit of Hojman et al,, are then assumed in order to
obtain the compatible gravitational dynamics. They are called in Du¨ll et al. (2018): (i) “local
phase space avatars of deformation operators”—corresponding to a matching of the Hamil-
tonian constraint algebra and the “felt geometry” deformation algebra, and (ii) “spacetime
diffeomorphism invariance” —corresponding to (2.10).
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The two conditions together require the existence of constraint functions on phase space:
H⊥(ξ⊥) =
∫
d3σ ξ⊥(σ)H⊥(φ, pi)(σ) ≈ 0 and H‖(ξ‖) :=
∫
Σ
d3σ ξi‖(σ)H‖i (φ, pi)(σ) ≈ 0
(3.4)
satisfying the same algebra as in (3.3) and (2.3). As before, the demands of (i) spacetime
embeddability and (ii) homomorphism of deformations to symplectic generators imply that
the total Hamiltonian for gravity be a fully constrained sum:
HQ(ξ⊥, ξ‖) =HQ⊥(ξ⊥) +H‖(ξ‖) (3.5)
where we have inserted a subscript Q to remind ourselves that the Hamiltonian could in
principle be different from the standard ADM Hamiltonian, depending on the matter dynamics.
Thus we can finally state:
Theorem 2 (Schuller et al) For any diffeomorphism-invariant matter action whose inte-
grand depends locally on some tensorial matter field B and ultralocally on a geometric back-
ground described by some tensor field G of arbitrary valence,
Smatter[B;G) =
∫
d4xLmatter(B(x), ∂B(x), . . . , ∂finiteB(x);G(x)) (3.6)
and that satisfies the three matter conditions (the existence of an initial value formulation for
the matter field equations; a one-to-one relation between momenta and velocities of massless
particles; the existence of an observer-independent definition of positive particle energy):—
one can calculate four geometry-dependent coefficients that enter the equations that guar-
antee that the geometrodynamical commutation algebra emulates the hypersurface deformation
algebra (i.e. the gravitational closure equations), which can be posed as a countable set of lin-
ear homogeneous partial differential equations. Then a solution of these equations, in turn,
provides a consistent action coupling the matter to the geometry:
Sclosed[B;G) = Smatter[B;G) +
∫
d4xLgeometry(G(x), ∂G(x), . . . , ∂finiteG(x)) (3.7)
Note that the theorem does not state the existence of such a solution for any given B and
G and equations of motion. Apart from known examples (such as classical electromagnetism)
which recover GR: so far as we know, no other geometrodynamical theory has been found by
explicitly solving the gravitational closure equations.
Ideally, the uniqueness theorem we seek would answer the following question: allowing for
different matter dynamics in the space of possible derived geometries, is the dynamics of the
standard model unique in singling out a meaningful dynamical spacetime? Or are there other
families of dynamical fields which would imply different types of (generalized) geometries?
Alas, no such theorem is known. In this sense, the programme does not as yet inform us
whether chrono-geometry as embodied by a Lorentzian spacetime can or cannot be separated
from the dynamics of matter. All we know so far is that for the dynamics of matter that we
have, e.g. classical electromagnetism, Lorentzian geometry is what we get. But so to speak:
we already knew that. In that sense, unfortunately, the programme does not yet help settle
whether matter dynamics or chronogeometry should have explanatory priority over the other.
But setting aside this limitation, the programme has the great merit of providing a framework
in which the matter dynamics poses strict consistency conditions on any gravitational theory
which is to accompany it; and in the future, more powerful statements might well be extracted
from this framework.
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3.4 A counter-example without spacetime diffeomorphism invariance
We have already seen that this programme’s assumptions include the action functional being
diffeomorphism invariant. In this final Subsection, we bring out the programme’s need for this
assumption, by pointing to an example that in its absence, exhibits electromagnetism with
the standard coupling to a Lorentzian metric, but also a non-orthodox geometrodynamics, i.e.
without an Einstein spacetime, or the strong equivalence principle.
This counter-example Gomes (2018, p. 317) is predicated on a symmetry principle distinct
from spacetime diffeomorphism invariance: namely, spatial conformal and diffeomorphism in-
variance. With this principle, one can stipulate an action that is radically different than the
orthodox Einstein-Hilbert one,24 and one can still couple spin-1 fields and gravity within a
consistent dynamics. And when the conformal curvature is small, the equations of motion ob-
tained by the action up to second order in derivatives recover precisely the Maxwell dynamical
equations in temporal gauge. Nonetheless, the spacetime obtained from the dynamics need not
satisfy the Einstein equations.25
Thus, without assuming spacetime diffeomorphism invariance from the outset, the dynam-
ical equations—even Maxwell’s—seem insufficient to determine the orthodox spacetime geom-
etry, i.e. orthodox geometrodynamics.
4 Realizing the temporal metric—from only spatial geometry
Let us introduce project (3) by sketching how it relates to projects (1) and (2). More precisely,
we will sketch how those projects prompt an expectation about the role of spacetime—which
project (3) defeats.
In section 2, we saw that Hojman et al. (1976) found a direct path from spacetime properties
to a Hamiltonian formalism: namely by emulating the algebra of embedded surfaces as a
constraint algebra in the Hamiltonian formalism. Then in Section 3, we reported on work
Schuller (2011) tying (certain types of) matter dynamics to the dynamics of spacetime. We
also pointed to obstacles to a unique specification of standard gravitational dynamics, once
one no longer assumes spacetime and its associated requirement of diffeomorphism invariance
of the action from which the dynamics are to be derived.
So in the light of these projects, one might expect that a 4-dimensional spacetime needs
to be assumed in order to arrive at a consistent dynamics of gravity and matter. That would
be a blow to relational approaches such as shape dynamics: which, as we will see in Section 5,
aims to base its ontology not on spacetime, but on conformal superspace. More specifically, it
would suggest that shape dynamics must somehow “piggy-back” on a spacetime framework.
But this is not so. In this Section, we will show that weaker requirements—which do not
assume spacetime or spacetime diffeomorphism invariance, at least in its usual form—suffice to
deduce general relativistic dynamics. That is: without presupposing spacetime, we will deduce
precisely the Hamiltonian of general relativity, i.e. of the form (2.9), for the appropriate scalar
and vector constraints of the ADM formalism. In short: while Hojman et al. found a path from
spacetime to a Hamiltonian formalism, here we will describe a path in the opposite direction.
24Without a reference density, one can build a conformally invariant 3+1 action by using the square root of
the Cotton tensor contracted with itself, cf. Gomes (2018, p. 314). Such an action has a completely different
structure than the Einstein-Hilbert one, even restricting to the simplest second-order in time-derivatives.
25The consistency conditions between the geometric tensor G and geometrodynamics found in Schuller (2011),
ensue only if one further assumes the matter dynamics generates local hypersurface deformations. This is not
at all necessary: the matter dynamics may define the translation of one hypersurface to the next in a global
manner.
25
4.1 Constraints on duration
We begin with the ‘top theory’ Tt, a theory of Riemannian geometry on a 3-manifold. More
precisely, we envisage a configuration space, Φ, whose elements ϕ are representations of the
instantaneous state of the Universe. By ‘instantaneous’ here, we do not mean any particular
spacelike embedding of a hypersurface into a spacetime—there is no spacetime yet! We mean
only that the fields at different points are dynamically unrelated. Thus we also assume that
the state of the Universe can depend on location. That is, we assume that the theory is not
altogether topological. Since we are dealing with field theories, this means that the theories in
question will have an infinite number of degrees of freedom (at least one per point of space).
In this picture, since change can be measured locally, it seems natural to also associate
duration with change locally. But duration is required to mesh in the right way; we will require
that the end result after evolution is independent of our choice of intermediate states. That is,
a final state is independent of the order in which two different changes are successively applied
to an initial state. At this point, we follow a slightly altered version of Hojman et al.’s demand
of “path-independence”. Their demand was that one falls on the same integral curve of the
Hamiltonian, irrespectively of the order of evolution. Ours will be a version specialized to pure
time evolution, and applying an equivalence relation based solely on the ‘instantaneous’ field
content of the theory.
More precisely, denoting two evolutions for ϕ, that may be distinct at distinct locations, by
∆1⊥ϕ and ∆
2
⊥ϕ, the consecutive evolution of the two should be independent of the intermediate
state. Thus we demand: ∆12⊥ ϕ = ∆
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⊥ ϕ. (We could omit the ⊥, since here we do not have
embedded surfaces; but it is an intuitive label.)
4.2 Constraints on evolution
Now we move to sketching the formulation of a Hamiltonian geometrodynamics, as our Tb. As
announced, the main result (Theorem 3 below) will be that in this theory, the ADM Hamil-
tonian (2.9) is the unique realizer of the functional role of ∆⊥. Since we seek a Hamiltonian
theory, the ‘instantaneous state’ of the Universe will be a phase space doublet, (hab, pi
ab). And
invoking the idea of spatial geometry, we require that the theory should depend on the doublet
(hab, pi
ab) only up to diffeomorphisms. That is, the theory should be invariant under spatial
diffeomorphisms.
Our definition of the Hamiltonian generators of change will, therefore, take the form of
constraints that the momenta and the metric have to satisfy. But here, we will not demand
that the symplectic generators of the diffeomorphisms reproduce the algebra of hypersurface
deformations—for in the present picture, we have neither spacetime diffeomorphisms nor hy-
persurfaces. We will not even demand Section 2’s full meshing relation, (2.10): we will only
need a similar relation for the pure time evolution, that is, the equivalent of ∆12⊥ ϕ = ∆
21
⊥ ϕ, up
to the equivalence relation of the theory, namely, spatial diffeomorphisms. This equivalent is
(4.1) below.
We will also assume that, whatever constraint we find for time evolution, it must be a
scalar. This is based on the demand on Tt that the theory contain local degrees of freedom. The
requirement is not mentioned by Hojman et al. because the evolution normal to a hypersurface
has only one direction (per point), and is thus already scalar. Here, without the aid of the
spacetime picture, we cannot appeal to that argument.
Here, the argument for a scalar Hamiltonian (i.e. that the Hamiltonian can depend at
most on a scalar Lagrange multiplier) just counts degrees of freedom. Let us rehearse how this
goes. In three dimensions, hij has six degrees of freedom; diffeomorphisms—being generated
by vector fields (Lagrange multipliers with three indices per space point)—take away three of
these. Since the Hamiltonian must preserve spatial diffeomorphism symmetry, as a constraint
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it should be first class with respect to the generator of spatial diffeomorphisms. Therefore, if it
was also generated by a vectorial Lagrange multiplier, we would have zero degrees of freedom
left!26 Thus, one further assumption that goes into our general derivation of geometrodynamical
evolution is that the theory is not topological.
Lastly, we require the Hamiltonian to depend at most quadratically on the momenta. This
can be justified by the need to avoid Ostrogradski instabilities (and thereby, an unphysical
theory) that higher-than-quadratic momenta would engender in the corresponding Lagrangian
theory (by inducing higher time derivatives). But for reasons of space, we will not give details;
for a review, cf. Woodard (2015).
These assumptions suffice to completely specify the Hamiltonian generating evolution. We
now sketch the proof presented in Gomes & Shyam (2016).
Statement of the results First, we stipulate the same generator of spatial diffeomorphisms
as in project (1), i.e. Hojman et al.’s (2.7): given the geometrodynamical phase space, this
generator, H‖, is unique.
The limited meshing relation we will require, namely, that the pure change part of the
evolutions mesh in the right way, can be mathematically represented as follows:
∆12⊥ ϕ = ∆
21
⊥ ϕ+ {ϕ,H‖}(F (ξ1, ξ2)), (4.1)
where F is some fixed phase space function—about which we presuppose nothing—with the ξ
as arguments, and where we have identified:
∆12⊥ ϕ := {{ϕ,H⊥(ξ1⊥)},H⊥(ξ2⊥)}, and ∆21⊥ ϕ := {{ϕ,H⊥(ξ2⊥)},H⊥(ξ1⊥)} . (4.2)
Equation (4.1) guarantees that ∆12⊥ ϕ ≈ ∆21⊥ ϕ because we have taken H‖ to be the generator
of spatial diffeomorphisms, and thus its action defines equivalence classes in terms of spatial
geometry.
Using the Jacobi identity, we find equation (4.1) holds if and only if
{H⊥(ξ1⊥),H⊥(ξ2⊥)} =H‖(F (ξ1, ξ2)) (4.3)
for some phase space function F ; (about which we again presuppose nothing, unlike Hojman
et al, who demand that H‖(F (ξ1, ξ2)) reproduce the hypersurface deformation algebra). And
moreover, if F turns out to be phase space dependent, we will require a second condition,
namely that H‖ ≈ 0.
We first write a general scalar Hamiltonian generator as a sum of a kinetic and a potential
term (both assumed to be non-identically zero):27
H⊥[piab, hab;σ) = T [piab, hab;σ) + V [hab;σ) . (4.4)
26Agreed: this argument rejects the possibility that the Lagrange multiplier itself be constrained; e.g. a
divergence-free vector field. The main reason is that this would introduce a Lagrange multiplier for a Lagrange
multiplier. Such symmetries are “reducible” and lie outside the scope of this investigation. If one wishes to
completely obviate the need for this argument, one could simply require that the gravitational field have two
propagating physical degrees of freedom; this already requires the remaining part of the Hamiltonian to be
scalar.
27In fact a bit more is assumed. If V ≡ 0, a slight generalization of T ensues in theorem 3 (still no derivatives
of the momenta, but more general contractions, i.e. an arbitrary DeWitt parameter); if T ≡ 0, any V is trivially
propagated. If V 6≡ 0 but contains no derivatives of the metric (i.e. it is proportional to the scalar density √g),
a linear term in the momenta in T arises, but this change can be accommodated by the purely quadratic term
through a canonical transformation which eliminates the potential term.
27
Since the possible terms linear in the momentum can be generated by a canonical transforma-
tion of the variables, T depends quadratically on the momenta.
The actual calculations are painstaking and cannot be meaningfully summarized here. For
the purpose of illustration, we present the general form of the kinetic and potential terms,
considered in Gomes & Shyam (2016, p. 112503-3). The general kinetic term is of the form:
T [h, pi;σ) =
∑
r,m,n
Bi1···in j1···jmabcd
(∇i1 · · · ∇inpicd) (∇j1 · · · ∇jmpiab) (σ) . (4.5)
The scalar function V [h, x) and the tensor Bi1···in j1···jmabcd depend on the metric hab and its deriva-
tives through Rkl,∇a1Rkl, · · · ,∇a1 · · · ∇arRkl where the number of explicit covariant deriva-
tives, r, is arbitrary. Note that in all generality, the spatial derivative order of Bi1···in j1···jmabcd and
V [h, σ) differ.
We can now state the theorem, proven in Gomes & Shyam (2016, p. 112503-23):
Theorem 3 (Rigidity) Equation (4.3) is satisfied by a unique generator in the family (4.4)
(with T as defined in (4.5)). Namely:
HADM⊥[h, pi;σ) :=
(
a
piabpiab − 12pi2√
h
− a−1(R− 2Λ)
√
h
)
(σ) (4.6)
where a and Λ are arbitrary constants.
Thus, since (4.3) is obtained with an F that is the same as given by the hypersurface
deformation algebra of (2.4) (and therefore F is phase-space-dependent). Thus (4.1) requires
H‖ ≈ 0. And since {H⊥,H‖} ∝ H⊥, dynamical preservation of H‖ ≈ 0 implies also that
H⊥ ≈ 0.
Thus we can now state:
Corollary 2 Given an equivalence relation supplied by spatial diffeomorphisms, (2.7), and a
generator of time evolution of the form (4.4), the only theory that enforces the meshing,28 or
path-independence condition, ∆12⊥ ϕ ≈ ∆21⊥ ϕ, given in equation (4.1) is the ADM form of general
relativity.
5 A corollary: shape dynamics exonerated
We turn to our positive corollary of Section 4. It is that another programme in foundations
of classical gravity, shape dynamics, is innocent of an accusation that one might be tempted
to make against it. The accusation arises from the fact that within a certain regime of shape
dynamics, its Hamiltonian matches that of general relativity i.e. is the ADM Hamiltonian.
This prompts the question, like I. Rabi’s quip when in 1936 the muon was discovered with its
surprising properties: ‘who ordered that?’ That is: what is the motivation, from within the
perspective of shape dynamics, for this form of Hamiltonian? Or more accusingly: is there
none? Has shape dynamics ‘simply grabbed’ the ADM Hamiltonian from its illustrious rival,
general relativity?
We will begin by recalling how the dialectic of such an accusation is often treated in phi-
losophy: namely, in terms of a much-cited quip by Bertrand Russell condemning ‘theft’ and
praising ‘honest toil’ (Section 5.1). This review will not be just a philosophical reminiscence.
28Of course, as in ADM, these definitions are unique only up to the relevant class of isomorphism of the
theory in question: here, symplectomorphisms (or canonical transformations).
28
Russell’s quip is unfair in a way that the ‘top theories’ Tt in this paper’s three projects illus-
trate. Then we will turn to shape dynamics. We first introduce it (Section 5.2); and then in
Section 5.3 we explain how, thanks to Section 4’s theorem, it is innocent of the accusation. It
has indeed undertaken, not theft, but honest toil.
5.1 Russell’s quip
Much of Russell’s writings in the period 1910 to 1930 proposed reductions in what Section 1.3
called the Nagelian sense: deduction of a ‘top theory’ Tt from a ‘bottom theory’ Tb, augmented
with extra premises we there labelled B (for ‘bridge-laws’). Russell’s motivation, indeed in-
spiration, was of course the logicist programme of Frege, himself and Whitehead to try to
reduce all of pure mathematics to logic: that is, to deduce pure mathematics from logic, aug-
mented with appropriate definitions of mathematical words (e.g. ‘real number’) in terms of
logic notions.
In the light of that endeavour, especially his and Whitehead’s magnum opus, Principia
Mathematica, Russell aimed to similarly reduce whole swathes of empirical knowledge, both
everyday and technical, to theories about sense-experience. And in the logical empiricist school
of the 1920s onwards, which was much influenced by logicism, other philosophers, such as
Carnap, articulated similarly ambitious philosophical programmes to reduce the ‘problematic’
realm of ‘the theoretical’ to ‘observation’: programmes that led directly to fellow-empiricist
Nagel’s formulation of reduction, as reviewed at the beginning of Section 1.3.
We need not linger on these philosophers’ aim of finding a firm foundation of empirical
knowledge in sense-experience, or ‘pure observation’: an aim that was much criticized from
about 1950 onwards.29 What matters for us is these philosophers’ admitting the need to
formulate judicious definitions that enable them to deduce the ‘problematic’ doctrine at issue.
They are thus opposed to so-called implicit definition, i.e. to thinking it is enough, for justifying
a concept or discourse, to give a set of postulates (‘axioms’) containing the concept and from
which one’s claims about it can be deduced. How do you know—they might say—that your
deduction sets out from safe ground?
Hence Russell’s famous quip about ‘theft over honest toil’. It is in his Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy (1919), in his discussion of deducing the truths of arithmetic from
logic, i.e. from set-theory (cf. footnote 29):
The method of ‘postulating’ what we want has many advantages; they are the same
as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others and proceed
with our honest toil. (1919, p. 71)
Thus ‘theft’ is here the dogmatic postulation of entities, as being those things that obey certain
axioms or postulates; and ‘toil’ is here the work of finding judicious definitions so that the
definienda can be shown using logical inference alone to satisfy the claims made about them.
Indeed, a bon mot; and much quoted. But it is unfair to dismiss making postulates at
the level of the ‘top theory’ as ‘theft’. In many cases, it is obviously hard work, even when
one is given an agreed stock of words or concepts, to formulate axioms whose consequences
express all that we wish to assert using those words or concepts. Think of the work involved
in axiomatising Euclidean geometry: whether by Euclid and his contemporaries, or in our own
era by Hilbert (in his Grundlagen der Geometrie of 1899) and his successors. Formulating
an axiom system that implies all the desired theorems is an achievement; (especially if one
requires, as Hilbert did, that the axioms be mutually independent). This is so, regardless of
29Let alone endorse it: cf. footnote 9. Nor need we linger on the shortcomings of logicism: in short, that the
most it could claim to achieve is the deduction of pure mathematics from a single part of it, viz. set-theory,
not from logic.
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whether one has the philosopher’s or logician’s interest in giving underlying ‘bottom theory’
definitions of the objects in geometry’s subject-matter; e.g. of what a point in the plane is in
terms of set-theory.
We see this point also in the top theories Tt of this paper’s three projects (and in our other
spacetime examples in Butterfield & Gomes (2020b)). For example, the formulation by Hojman
et al. of their deformation algebra is an achievement, regardless of whether one goes on—as
indeed they did—to give an underlying ‘bottom theory’ realization of it as a Hamiltonian
constraint algebra. Similarly, the formulation by Schuller et al. of generalized geometries is
an achievement, regardless of whether one goes on—as indeed they did—to give an underlying
‘bottom theory’ invoking predictivity and good behaviour conditions for matter and radiation,
and showing a solution of the resulting consistency conditions. Lastly, the formulation by
Gomes and Shyam of path independence of evolution of spatial quantities is an achievement,
regardless of whether one goes on to specify a Hamiltonian that has these properties.30
So much by way of general philosophy. We turn to shape dynamics: to urge that thanks to
Section 4’s theorem, its use of the ADM Hamiltonian is not a case of theft.
5.2 A brief introduction to shape dynamics
This will be a very brief, and so incomplete, introduction to shape dynamics. For more technical
details, see Mercati (2017, Ch. 12) and Gomes et al. (2011); Gomes & Koslowski (2012).
The relational motivation for shape dynamics Conceptually, shape dynamics is an offspring of
relationism. Relationism starts from the idea that all measurements are comparisons: that
doubling the size of all the rods and of the universe alongside them, will change nothing
measurable; and that speeding up all clocks and physical phenomena alongside them, will
change nothing measurable. No one has ever concretely measured (nor ever will measure) a
fundamentally dimensionful quantity.31
But even if one accepts that fundamentally only relations are physically measured, general
relativity associates a dimensionful quantity to trajectories (curves) in space-time, irrespec-
tively of relations to any other object: namely, proper time (or distance). The “experienced
time” along a trajectory in space-time depends only on the trajectory itself, without reference
to anything else. (This time is of course determined only up to an affine transformation, reflect-
ing a choice of unit and zero.) So prima facie, general relativity fails to be relational, because
of its physically significant but conformally non-invariant “experienced time” (i.e. proper time
and distance). Although we believe that proper time should be a physical correlate of some-
thing relational, such as a ratio of numbers of oscillations of two atoms, the theory does not
explicitly require such an understanding.
So it is tempting to impose scale-invariance at the fundamental, theory-building level, as
a criterion: to require theories to build all physical quantities from relations. Over the years,
prompted by this sort of relational rationale, many consistent theories of gravity with 4–
dimensional space-time scale-invariance have been proposed.32 But, so far as we know, none
has overcome this shortcoming of general relativity, while keeping its explanatory power.
30Fortunately, the point is also noticed by philosophers of logic. Oliver & Smiley (2016, p. 272) call Russell’s
bon mot ‘one of the shoddiest slogans in philosophy’. And their reason is exactly this point: that writing down
the right analysis of a concept, before any ‘reduction’ begins, often requires honest toil. Thus they point out
that (i) Russell originally aimed it, unfairly, at Dedekind’s treatment of continuity, and (ii) ‘it assumes [wrongly]
that we already know what we want . . . the examples from Dedekind show just how much honest toil it takes
to discover—to formulate precisely—just what it is that we want’.
31See Barbour (1999) for an eloquent defence of these ideas.
32Such models come under different names (e.g. conformal gravity and Weyl gravity). Their appeal lies in
their renormalization properties, see e.g. Fradkin & Tseytlin (1985); Stelle (1977).
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But if we accept the ontological ‘3+1’ split of spacetime into space and time, we can perhaps
break this impasse. For we now gain access to a different kind of symmetry: those that act
on each spatial field configuration. Spatial diffeomorphisms enforce the notion that location
is relational; i.e. positions only make sense relative to other positions. Analogously, spatial
conformal invariance is a relational symmetry: it means that local scale can only be made sense
of relationally, i.e. by comparing one size to another.
The technical argument for shape dynamics. In brief, the technical idea behind shape dynamics,
is that the ADM formulation of general relativity, with its refoliation redundancy (represented
by HADM⊥ ≈ 0), is dual to a theory that possesses spatial conformal invariance. The reason
such a dual formulation is possible, is that the constraint that is the symplectic generator
of conformal transformations, is first class with respect to diffeomorphisms, and can be seen
as a gauge-fixing of the symmetries generated by HADM⊥. Thus we can represent the ADM
Hamiltonian in an alternative (non-local) form in the space of conformal geometries. The
details of this duality are spelled out in Gomes & Koslowski (2012). Here, for brevity, we
will only describe how the theory is closely related to what is known as the ‘York method’ for
solving general relativity’s initial value constraints.
We start from the fact that in the ADM formulation, not all initial data (hab, piab) are
acceptable. To find initial data, we must first solve the two ADM constraints, H⊥ =H‖ = 0.
The York method Isenberg et al. (1976); York (1971) is the only known mathematical tool
for generically attacking the initial value problem of general relativity Gourgoulhon (2007).
Indeed, most of the formal proofs of existence and uniqueness of solutions of general relativistic
dynamics require the use of a particular choice of foliation, namely that the mean (of the trace
of the) extrinsic curvature (CMC) be constant throughout the given leaf. And as we shall see in
a moment, this foliation is the one that is compatible with the existence of a shape dynamics
solution. As a matter of fact, every test that has ever been passed by GR is known to be
consistent with a CMC foliation.33
More importantly for us, it turns out that this choice has special properties: it allows a
description of the evolution of spatial geometry without reference to local spatial scale. That is,
it allows one to describe gravitational evolution in the auxiliary time τ , 34 in terms of spatially
‘conformally invariant’ geometries. This is because the constraints that these foliations are
obliged to satisfy in order to be CMC, namely,
C = trpi − τ
√
h = 0, (5.1)
where tr pi = habpi
ab and τ is a constant, generate, via Noether’s theorem, canonical transfor-
mations. Such transformations are exactly changes of spatial scale, i.e. the local conformal
transformations.35 These results show that surprisingly, although general relativity is not fun-
damentally concerned with spatial conformal geometries, it is deeply related to them.
Schematically, the trade can be represented, in the jargon of Dirac constraint analysis, as
two first class constraint surfaces being fully second-class with respect to each other. Being
‘first class’ means that constraints weakly commute, that is, that they close on-shell and thus
33 The foliation does break down inside known solutions with event horizons. But, in the generic case where
event horizons form, Marsden and Tipler conjecture that “the [CMC] foliation does fill out at least the exterior
of the event horizon of the singularity, and that the foliation fills out the entire spacetime if it is geodesically
complete ”Marsden & Tipler (1980, p. 126).
34Which, from (5.1), is just the average of the trace of the momenta, τ :=
∫
trpi
V (h) , where V (h) :=
∫ √
h.
35In fact, the momenta are set to be constant trace, not trace-free; which would be the true generator of
conformal transformations. However, one can interpret the constant trace part as defining an auxiliary quantity,
the York time. The transverse traceless choice sets the gravitational momenta to be purely tensorial (spin-2),
with no scalar (spin-0) or vector (spin-1) components.
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can be taken as symmetry generating; ‘second class’ means that they do not weakly commute,
indeed, their Poisson bracket forms an invertible matrix, and thus one phase space function
serves as a gauge-fixing for the other. See figure 5.2.
These properties mean that we can split H⊥ into a local and a global part. The local
constraint generates a symmetry that can be traded with local conformal invariance, whereas
the global part generates a non-local Hamiltonian in conformal superspace, that we can write,
in the unconstrained phase space as:
Hglobal =
∫
(Ω6(h, pi)− 1)
√
h (5.2)
where Ω is the York conformal factor (described in appendix A).
Thus H⊥−Hglobal is entirely second class with respect to C, and we have two separate first
class systems of local constraints: the standard ADM one, given by H⊥ ≈ 0 and H‖ ≈ 0, and
the shape dynamics one,
C ≈ 0, H‖ ≈ 0 : (5.3)
which are both conserved by the Hamiltonian Hglobal. Moreover, the dynamics of this system
matches that of ADM general relativity (whenever a CMC foliation is available, as discussed
above).
In sum, shape dynamics amounts to taking seriously these hints: hints from the initial
value formulation of general relativity and from considering symmetries compatible with in-
stantaneous physical configuration states. The result is a theory about the dynamics of space
that is based on different symmetry principles than the standard diffeomorphism or Lorentz
invariance of spacetime. Namely, the symmetries of the theory are taken to be conformal dif-
feomorphisms. Indeed, starting from the broad idea that shape dynamics is to be a theory
about space, it is natural to focus on the space Riem, of unconstrained spatial 3-metrics on a
3-manifold, Σ. Then one can justify the symmetry group of spatial conformal diffeomorphisms
as being the maximal local group of symmetries acting on Riem Gomes (2018). Thus we get
the idea of conformal superspace, which has been shown to have a well-defined symplectic
reduction Fischer & Marsden ((1977)).
But as we have also seen, it has one peculiar feature: a non-local generator of evolution
(Hamiltonian). And if we focus on conformal superspace, there are admittedly many Hamil-
tonians on it that look more natural than the non-local one that shape dynamics officially
adopts: viz. the Hamiltonian obtained by extending general relativity’s ADM Hamiltonian
to this space. Agreed: this official choice enables shape dynamics to match (in many circum-
stances) the successes of general relativity.36 But the choice looking unnatural triggers the
accusation of ‘theft’ ...
5.3 Shape dynamics exonerated
But Section 4’s Theorem 3 exonerates shape dynamics. For from most such natural Hamilto-
nians on conformal superspace, we would not be able to deduce appropriate relations to ‘local
change’, or duration in the sense of Section 4.1.
To put the point more specifically and more positively, in terms of functionalist reduction:
the shape dynamics Hamiltonian is the nearest realizer on (the cotangent bundle of) conformal
superspace of a Hamiltonian possessing a representative that—that is: that in some gauge—
yields the notion of duration which we formulated in Section 4.1’s Tt. That is: this Hamiltonian
gives, in some nearest realization, a reduction, in the vocabulary of conformal superspace (Tb),
of the Tt notion of time.
36 Fortunately, we can in many circumstances find explicit solutions of shape dynamics, albeit at the cost of
simplifying the problem by assuming it is highly symmetric: see Mercati (2017, Ch. 13), and references therein.
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  Conformal
Hamiltonian
Figure 2: A schematic representation of the phase space of general relativity. In it, two
constraints coexist, which are good gauge-fixings for each other and are both first-class with
respect to the diffeomorphism constraint. One is the Hamiltonian constraint and the other is
the conformal (Weyl) constraint. The Hamiltonian constraint is completely gauge-fixed by the
conformal constraint except for a single residual global constraint. It Poisson-commutes with
the conformal constraint and generates a vector flow on the Hamiltonian constraint surface
(represented in the figure), which is parallel to the conformal constraint surface. This vector
flow generates the time evolution of the system in the intersection between the two surfaces.
Any solution can then be represented in an arbitrary conformal gauge by lifting it from the
intersection to an arbitrary curve on the conformal constraint surface. All such lifted curves are
gauge-equivalent solutions of a conformal gauge theory with conformally-invariant Hamiltonian.
That, through Theorem 3, this can be done without invoking spacetime ideas—in particular,
without invoking the relativity of simultaneity, or its more sophisticated cousin, refoliation
invariance—is, we submit, remarkable. And it is essential for the basic outlook of shape
dynamics, i.e. an ontology based on conformal superspace, to be tenable.
In sum: shape dynamics is exonerated as the unique theory in conformal superspace that
can be lifted to match the dynamics of a theory of spatial metrics with a local notion of
duration.
6 Conclusions
We shall not here summarise the three geometrodynamical projects, (1) to (3), that we have
reviewed and connected to functionalist reduction. For Section 1.2 summarised them in them-
selves, and Section 1.3 summarised them as illustrations of functionalist reduction. Let us
instead give a table, allowing one to compare at a glance these three projects, and also shape
dynamics.
The projects: their assumptions, results and uniqueness
spacetime mani-
fold?
Spacetime met-
ric?
Recover Ein-
steinian dyn.?
Uniqueness the-
orem?
Hojman et al. X X X X
Schuller et al. X × ? ×
Gomes-Shyam × × X X
Shape dynam. × × X X∗
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This table, with its brief labels, summarizes in the first two columns the assumptions, and
in the last two columns the results, of functional reduction. It is of course a simplification of the
situation. For example: although project (2) (by Schuller et al.) does not assume a Lorentzian
metric, it does use some (dynamical) notion of a coupling metric, or geometry (the tensor G).
On the other hand, the purely spatial ontology of project (3) Gomes & Shyam (2016) has a
spatial Riemannian metric in its fundamental variables. We have also put an asterisk in the
last item (uniqueness theorem for shape dynamics), because (as discussed in Section 5.3) it is
the unique theory in conformal superspace that can be lifted to match the dynamics of a theory
of spatial metrics with a local notion of duration. That is: the asterisk signals the fact that
it does not have a uniqueness theorem solely in terms of conformal superspace. The question
mark in the third column, for project (2), is correlated to a lack of uniqueness: for we do not
know if there are matter fields which would allow a different sort of spacetime (and spacetime
dynamics) through the constructions of that project.
In this paper, we have used the philosophical idea of functionalist reduction to characterize
time in three broadly geometrodynamical—but purely classical—theories. We thus arrive, in
effect, at the threshold of one of H-D. Zeh’s main endeavours: to understand time in quantum
geometrodynamics. That is of course a vast endeavour, in which Zeh, his many collaborators
such as Kiefer Kiefer (2012), and of course many others, have done a great deal of work. We
obviously cannot go into this here: (for masterly introductions to the programme, cf. Zeh
(1992, Ch. 6) and Kiefer (2012, Ch. 5)). In closing, let us just make a hopeful remark on the
possible use of our philosophical notions of functional role, and functionalist reduction.
We recall that in this endeavour, one main aim is to extract a time variable, with respect to
which the matter degrees of freedom would obey a time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation, from
a WKB-like approximation to the (fundamentally timeless) Wheeler-DeWitt equation. We can
think of this as an internal time being identified by its functional role: the matter degrees
of freedom are functionally differentiated, and identifying the functional coefficient with time
yields a Schrodinger-like equation for these degrees of freedom. Accordingly, our discussion
suggests that one might explore defining time by other possible functional roles. But of course,
whether any such definition will prove useful in the context of quantum geometrodynamics
remains to be seen. We can only hope that the functionalist reductive perspective we have
offered here for the classical case may prove useful in people’s effort to better understand the
quantum case ... long may Hans-Dieter Zeh’s scientific creativity and craftsmanship inspire
that effort!
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A The York method
Let us briefly review the York method, by which general relativity’s constraints decouple and
turn into elliptic equations. On a closed spatial hypersurface, we start with the (by-now
standard!) metric hab and tensor density pi
ab; but also with a real number τ . The York method
then consists in the following steps:
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1. Given a traceless tensor, one can find its projection to a transverse component. That is,
upon the substitution piab → piab −∇(aχj) (where round brackets signify index
symmetrization, A(ab) := Aab + Aba) and ∇ is the Levi-Civita covariant derivative with
respect to hab, one can solve the transversality condition (with respect to the vector field χ
a):
∇b(∇(aχb) − 2
3
hab∇cχc) = ∇b(piab − 1
3
trpi hab) .
Thereby we obtain the transverse-traceless momentum piabTT:
piabTT = (pi
ab − 1
3
habtrpi)− (∇aχb +∇bχa − 2
3
hab∇cχc) .
This means that for any constant τ , the momentum pab := piabTT +
1
2
τ hab
√
h satisfies H‖ = 0.
Importantly, it represents a CMC slicing (constant mean curvature), since its trace is
necessarily constant:
habp
ab =
3
2
τ
√
h = const.
√
h .
2. Upon conformally transforming the canonical variables, as (hab, pi
ab
TT)→ (Ω4hab,Ω−4piabTT),
from the scalar constraint H⊥ = 0 one obtains the Lichnerowicz–York equation (LY) with
respect to the scalar field Ω:
Ω−6√
h
piabTT
2 − 3
8
√
hΩ6τ 2 −
√
h
(
RΩ2 − 8 Ω∆Ω) = 0 .
This is an elliptic equation which can, under certain additional assumptions, be solved for Ω:
thereby satisfying all of the ADM constraints on a CMC slice
(
tr p = 3
2
τ
√
h
)
. The metric
and momenta satisfying the initial value problem are then given by pab and γab = Ω
4hab.
One important point hidden in the analysis is that the LY equation and the transversality
condition are conformally invariant:{
hab → e4φhab
piab → e−4φpiab ⇒
{
γab[e
4φhab, e
−4φpiab] = γab[h, pi]
pab[e4φhab, e
−4φpiab] = pab[hab, piab] .
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